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Abstract 
This thesis centers on the interrelationships and differences in firearm legislation 
and culture within the United States of America and Australia. As a result of the Port 
Arthur Massacre on April 28, 1996, Australia was faced with an unprecedented mass 
shooting that completely shifted Australian politics and culture regarding firearm safety 
and availability. Thus, the thesis inquiries into the effectiveness of Australia’s buyback 
program as well as the cultural and political factors that allowed for such legislation to be 
passed. After suffering 118 mass shootings in the U.S. since 1982, the history of the 
United States regarding gun control is one of inaction. Overall, that is why the core of my 
thesis is rooted in the culture of each nation regarding firearms; it determines what about 
Australia created an environment amicable to gun control that seems impossible in the 
U.S. The answer to this question rests in many factors: the history of each nation, the role 
of lobby groups (such as the NRA), the structure of government, public opinion, and the 
rights of citizens (the Second Amendment). Balancing all of these factors, this thesis 
acknowledges that the U.S. could not have as drastic a policy response as that of 
Australia, but the U.S. can easily implement effective firearm safety measures that cuts 
through the partisanship divide of gun rights activists and pro-gun control lobbyists.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Leone 3 
Table of Contents  
Introduction – Why Guns? .......................................................................................... 4 
Chapter I: Stick ‘Em Up! The History of Gun Violence in the United States .................... 7 
A. History of the Second Amendment in the U.S. ............................................................7 
B. 1994 Assault Weapon Ban and its Implications on U.S. Gun Legislation and Violence . 15 
C. The Current State of Gun Violence and Policy in the U.S. ........................................... 22 
Chapter II: Down Under! The History of Australian Gun Violence ............................... 29 
A. History of Gun Legislation and Violence in Australia before Port Arthur..................... 29 
B. Port Arthur Massacre and its Implications on Gun Legislation and Violence ............... 43 
C. The Current State of Gun Legislation and Violence in Australia .................................. 50 
Chapter III: The Culture Question .............................................................................. 58 
A. Analysis of Australia’s Structure of Government ....................................................... 59 
B. History of Australia’s Colonization ............................................................................ 62 
C. What is Australian (firearm) nationalism? ................................................................. 65 
D. America’s Colonial Legacy of Firearm Culture ............................................................ 71 
E. The Unstoppable NRA .............................................................................................. 73 
Chapter IV: Where does one go from here? ............................................................... 77 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Leone 4 
Introduction – Why Guns? 
 
 Ranging from pro-gun lobby groups, to media outlets, and even to one’s estranged 
uncle, the common argument of “guns don’t kill people; people do,”1 is constantly 
thrown around in American culture. While many Americans do not view their gun laws 
as unusual compared to those of other countries, the rest of the world recognizes the 
distinctiveness of the fervor that U.S. gun culture radiates.2 Since 1789, twenty-four 
constitutions from nine different nations have contained some sort of mention to gun 
rights, and since World War II no country has written a constitution that includes such a 
right.3 Currently, the United States, Guatemala, and Mexico are the only remaining 
countries that guarantee the right to bear arms, yet the U.S. Constitution is the only 
constitution that omits any written conditions under which the government can regulate 
arms and munitions.4  
As a result, the crux of this thesis revolves around the question of culture and whether 
it drives law and policy or vice versa. Australia was chosen for this comparative analysis 
with the United States, for in 1996 Australia suffered a devastating mass shooting 
committed by a lone gunman with enormous legal firepower. Unlike the United States 
which has been faced with 118 mass shootings since 1982 with no substantive additions 
to nation-wide gun control legislation,5 Australia treated its one respective mass shooting 
 
1 David Kyle Johnson, “Guns Don’t Kill People, People Do? What exactly is wrong with the argument,” 
Psychology Today, February 12, 2013, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog.  
2 Larry Donnelly, “America’s gun culture: What makes Americans so attached to their weapons?” 
TheJournal.ie, March 4, 2018, https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/americas-gun-culture-3877087-Mar2018/. 
3 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, “U.S. Gun Rights Truly Are American 
Exceptionalism,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 7, 2013, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2013-
03-07.  
4 Id. 
5 For this thesis, mass shootings are defined in line with the FBI’s definition. Up until 2013, this entailed a 
single attack in a public place with 4 victim deaths. Since 2013, the baseline has been lowered to 3 victim 
deaths. See Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen and Deanna Pan, “US Mass Shootings, 1982-2019: Data From 
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as the breaking point that ushered in changes to their nation’s gun laws.6 As Australian 
journalist A. Odysseus Patrick expresses, “We Australians have a profoundly different 
relationship with weapons. Americans love guns. We’re scared of them.”7 Therefore, this 
thesis is interested in how one “western” democracy, Australia, could accomplish such a 
degree of gun control while a similar western democracy, the United States, is incapable 
of doing so. It integrates the history of gun legislation and mass shootings in the United 
States and Australia alongside culture, history, public opinion, and possible future policy 
outcomes for the United States to understand the causal factors leading to different gun 
policies in Australia and the U.S. 
The thesis’ first chapter examines the respective history of gun legislation, 
violence, and culture in the United States of America. Afterwards, the second chapter 
takes the exact same course as the first but applies it to Australia. In laying out the 
framework of gun policy and politics juxtaposed with culture, the thesis attempts to 
scrutinize how the Australian Government managed to act swiftly on the matter whereas 
the issue of gun control in the U.S. is violently partisan. Then, chapter three analyzes 
culture and its impact on gun legislation across the two countries. It lays out the structure 
of the Australian and U.S. governments before scrutinizing the effect of colonization and 
nationalism. Lastly, chapter four looks at the possible policies the United States could 
adopt to fix its current nationwide problem of firearm violence. After acknowledging that 
the U.S. cannot follow in the footsteps of Australia’s policy and should not simply 
 
Mother Jones’ Investigation,” Mother Jones, Updated: February 26, 2020, 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data/.  
6 Matthew Grimson, “Port Arthur Massacre: The Shooting Spree That Changed Australia’s Gun Laws,” 
NBC News, July 25, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/port-arthur-massacre-shooting-spree-
changed-australia-gun-laws-n396476. 
7 A. Odysseus Patrick, “Australia’s Gun Laws Are Not a Model for America,” The New York Times, 
February 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/opinion/australias-gun-laws-america.html. 
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continue to do nothing about the issue, the thesis concludes with a list of possible policy 
ideas that would preserve gun owners’ rights while also further safeguarding the security 
of all people. 
In sum, the overarching thesis question is, “What made Australia’s gun culture so 
much more favorable to gun control than the gun culture of the United States? From this 
initial question, numerous sub-questions arise. First, did the Port Arthur Massacre in 
April 1996 and Prime Minister John Howard’s response reshape Australia’s culture of 
mass shootings and attitudes towards firearms, or did it merely act as a band-aid solution 
in a time of homogeneity that failed to counter violence? As a result, with the stark 
increase of mass shootings in the United States of America in the 21st century, would a 
U.S. response like Australia’s be feasible, rational, and supported? Or, would America’s 
strong gun culture and polarization, fueled by gun lobbies such as the National Rifle 
Association, and the presence of the 2nd Amendment with its recent judicial 
interpretation, prevent major changes to U.S. law? 
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Chapter I: Stick ‘Em Up! The History of Gun Violence in the United 
States 
 
A. History of the Second Amendment in the U.S.  
 
The Second Amendment serves as the foundation for an American culture rooted 
in the proliferation of firearms. Before 2008, the Second Amendment was historically 
perceived by the majority of judges, academics, and lawyers to entail a right to bear arms 
that could be regulated by the state governments.8 However, because of the nature and 
power of judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court was capable of reinterpreting the 
Second Amendment to give power to the citizens of the U.S. to be able to obtain and hold 
guns as individuals.9 In 2008, the Supreme Court’s ruling in District of Columbia v 
Heller massively shifted the narrative of what the Second Amendment means.  
Under District of Columbia law, it was a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, 
and the registration of handguns was forbidden thereby making handgun possession 
illegal.10 A D.C. special policeman, Dick Heller, attempted to register a handgun he 
wished to keep at home, but the District refused.11 After filing a suit on Second 
Amendment grounds, the case made it to the Supreme Court where it ruled in a 5-4 vote 
that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms for “the core lawful purpose 
of self-defense.”12 In addition, the majority opinion of the Court written by Justice Scalia 
struck down opposing arguments emphasizing the requirement for firearm possession to 
 
8 Joseph E. Sitzmann, "High-Value, Low-Value, and No-Value Guns: Applying Free Speech Law to the 
Second Amendment," The University of Chicago Law Review 86, no. 7 (November 2019): 1986-87, 
www.jstor.org/stable/26792622. 
9 Pooja Toor, “United States vs. Everybody, a comparative analysis of gun laws in America and various 
countries around the world,” Journal of Law and International Affairs at Penn State Law, April 3, 2018, 
https://sites.psu.edu/jlia/author/pxt41/#_edn4. 
10 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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be linked with service in a “well-regulated militia.” The Supreme Court held, “The 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with 
service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-
defense within the home;”13 thus, the Court broke the Second Amendment up into its 
prefatory and operative clauses underlying the prefatory clause’s inability to limit or 
expand the scope of the operative clause.14 Although District of Columbia v Heller 
shifted the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment, it failed to provide 
an all-encompassing view of what the Second Amendment entails for U.S. citizens. 
Within the opinion of the Court, the Court claims, “One should not expect it [D.C. v 
Heller] to clarify the entire field.”15 This inability of the Supreme Court to wholesomely 
define its stance on the Second Amendment has caused federal courts to struggle in 
analyzing Second Amendment cases, yet the Supreme Court has not intervened to 
provide any clarity on the confusion.16 
Nevertheless, two years after District of Columbia v Heller, the Supreme Court 
once again upheld handgun ownership on Second Amendment grounds in the case 
McDonald v Chicago (2010).17 Following the ruling in Heller, petitioners filed a federal 
suit against the City of Chicago for its laws which effectively banned handgun possession 
by almost all private citizens.18 The petitioners held that Chicago’s handgun ban had left 
them vulnerable to criminals and was a violation of the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments, but the federal court refuted this charge asserting that Heller had not 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id at 630. 
16 Sitzmann, “Applying Free Speech Law,” 1983. 
17 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
18 Id.  
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commented on whether the Second Amendment applied to the States.19 After reaching 
the Supreme Court, Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court reaffirming the ruling 
in Heller that “the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense,” and the Court added that since the Court had “previously held 
that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply with full force to both the Federal 
Government and the States… we hold that the Second Amendment right is fully 
applicable to the States.”20 Hence, to justify the Second Amendment’s authority over 
state governments, McDonald v Chicago intertwined the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause alongside the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.21 Inevitably, on the 
grounds that the Court has guaranteed protections to most of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights under the Due Process Clause, the opinion of the Court enforced the Second 
Amendment against the States under the same standards to protect these personal rights 
against federal encroachment.22 With regard to protecting a citizen’s individual liberties 
that come with the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court made the right ruling in these 
cases.  
Now, in criticizing the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on the Second Amendment 
in comparison to the Court’s precedent prior to District of Columbia v Heller, this thesis 
raises the views of early Americans before juxtaposing their stances with the dissenting 
opinions of District of Columbia v Heller. Since Heller stands as a powerful example of 
the way that American gun culture has reshaped gun jurisprudence, the rulings of Presser 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id at 749-50. 
21 The Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
22 561 U.S. 764-5 (2010). 
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v Illinois (1886), U.S. v Miller (1939), and Lewis v U.S. (1980) are raised to express the 
shift in Supreme Court precedent regarding the Second Amendment. 
William Rawle was an American lawyer who served as U.S. District Attorney for 
Pennsylvania in the 1790s after being appointed by George Washington.23 Within 
William Rawle’s view of the U.S. Constitution in 1829, he portrayed, “No clause in the 
Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress a power 
to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general 
pretence by a state legislature.”24 As a result, while Rawle stresses the federal 
government’s inability to disarm the people, he illustrates the necessity of states to adopt 
regulations that prevent both a disorderly militia and an assemblage of persons with arms 
for an unlawful purpose in order to “make good soldiers with the least interruptions of the 
ordinary and useful occupations of civil life.”25  
Rawle’s position mirrors that of Justice Stevens in D.C. v Heller, for William 
Rawle places the Second Amendment as a restraint on the federal government, not 
necessarily on the state governments, to disarm the people “in any blind pursuit of 
inordinate power.”26 In a similar manner, Justice Stevens starts by highlighting the 
Founders’ intention for the Second Amendment to ensure the people of each state could 
maintain a well-regulated militia due to concerns raised during the ratification of the 
Constitution that Congress may attempt to disarm state militias to create a national 
 
23 “William Rawle,” University of Pennsylvania, https://archives.upenn.edu/exhibits/penn-
people/biography/william-rawle. 
24 William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (Philadelphia 1829) in “The 
Founders’ Constitution: Vol. 5, Amend. II, Doc. 9” http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs9.html. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
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standing army that would threaten the sovereignty of the several States.27 Therefore, the 
Second Amendment text and the arguments made by its proponents had no intention to 
limit the state legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms or to 
enshrine a doctrine of self-defense in the Constitution.28 In light of Justice Steven’s 
dissent, it is clear that the District of Columbia’s prohibition of handgun ownership is not 
a blind pursuit of inordinate power, but rather it is an attempt to combat the egregious 
nature of handgun violence in the City which is committed by an assemblage of persons 
with arms for an unlawful purpose.29  
In fact, Justice Breyer’s dissent in District of Columbia v Heller makes mention of 
colonial state governments’ actions to regulate firearm use. Boston, Philadelphia, and 
New York City all restricted the firing of guns within city limits to some degree.30 Along 
with these three cities, several other towns and cities not only regulated the storage of 
gunpowder but also prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms anywhere in the city, 
unless the carrier did not plan on entering a building with a loaded firearm.31 Altogether, 
through the inclusion of this historical evidence, Justice Breyer demonstrates that “a self-
defense assumption is the beginning, rather than the end, of any constitutional inquiry.”32 
While retaining the self-defense right serves to protect the Second Amendment, it fails to 
acknowledge the law’s rationale and the problems it is responding to; by banning 
handguns completely, law enforcement officers can immediately assume that any 
 
27 554 U.S. 637 (2008). 
28 Id. 
29 554 U.S. 637 (2008). 
30 Id at 683. 
31 Id at 684-5. 
32 Id at 687. 
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handgun in someone’s possession is illegal thus significantly reducing the number of 
handguns in D.C. and alleviating the recorded problem of handgun violence in D.C.33  
 In Presser v Illinois (1886), Herman Presser attempted to file a case against the 
state of Illinois for indicting him on charges that he violated the Military Code of Illinois 
by marching with an armed body of men without a license.34 Here, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Second Amendment is “a limitation only on the power of Congress and the 
national government, and not of the States.”35 Moreover, the Court also ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not “prevent a State from passing such laws to regulate the 
privileges and immunities of its own citizens as do not abridge their privileges and 
immunities as citizens of the United States.”36 This ruling clearly runs counter to the 
current rhetoric of the Supreme Court in both Heller and McDonald, yet a modern self-
defense narrative has trumped previous judicial precedent to strip states of their right to 
maintain overarching firearm regulations. 
 Next, in deciding the extent to which the federal government may regulate the 
ownership of firearms by citizens, U.S. v Miller (1939) upheld the indictment of Jack 
Miller and Frank Layton for knowingly and willfully transporting an unregistered sawed-
off shotgun less than eighteen inches in length.37 Under the National Firearms Act of 
1934, the Act imposed a tax on the making and transfer of certain firearms and required 
U.S. citizens to register all NFA firearms with the Secretary of Treasury; these certain 
firearms included shotguns and rifles with barrels less than eighteen inches in length and 
 
33 Id at 687, 711. 
34 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
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certain other weapons such as machineguns, firearm mufflers, and silencers.38 In citing 
the National Firearms Act, U.S. v Miller affirmed that it was neither an invasion of the 
reserved powers of the States for the federal government to regulate certain firearms nor 
did it violate the Second Amendment, for the firearms in question had no “reasonable 
relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.”39 Overall, this 
power for government to regulate criminal firearm behavior carries over to the majority 
opinions in Heller and McDonald. Justice Scalia expresses:  
“Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited… The Court’s opinion should not 
be taken to cast doubt on long standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” 
finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual 
weapons.”40  
 
 Hence, the majority opinion acknowledges government’s power to regulate 
firearms in certain circumstances without infringing on individual rights. 
 Within Lewis v U.S. (1980), George Calvin Lewis Jr. filed a suit against the U.S. 
for preventing him from owning a firearm due to a previous felony conviction.41 
Ultimately, the Court upheld the previous rulings on the case attesting that the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, which prohibited felons from owning firearms, was constitutional.42 
In applying a “rational basis” standard, the Court defended the necessity for felons to first 
receive pardon for their felony status before obtaining a firearm.43 Consequently, this 
prevention of felons to acquire a gun fulfills “Congress’ purpose to keep firearms away 
 
38 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, “National Firearms Act,” ATF, 1934. 
39 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
40 554 U.S. 571 (2008). 
41 445 U.S. 55 (1980). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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from persons classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous” thus emphasizing the 
government’s ability to restrict the rights of individuals who violate U.S. law.44 
 Within cases before Heller, the Supreme Court managed to visibly draw lines 
where firearm regulations were constitutional or unconstitutional. Because the Bill of 
Rights only applied to the federal government during these initial cases, the Court upheld 
firearm regulations on the basis that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states. 
Since the Bill of Rights has now been applied to the states following the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Heller and McDonald have created a new precedent where a Second 
Amendment right to self-defense in conjunction with firearm ownership cannot be 
infringed upon at the state or federal level. 
 In sum, the history of the Second Amendment in the United States’ judicial 
system and culture demonstrates the discrepancies of the present-day rulings of the 
Supreme Court that stress self-defense and deregulation of firearms at a state and federal 
level compared to the history of Supreme Court precedent that acknowledged the abilities 
of the state and federal governments to regulate and limit Second Amendment rights for 
the safety and security of the nation. Overall, when politically charged in the modern era, 
the “right to keep and bear arms” has struck a chord with people of very different 
backgrounds, experiences, and cultures albeit a nation’s previous history of regulation.45 ‘ 
 
 
 
 
44 Id. 
45 David Morton, “Gunning for the World,” Foreign Policy, no. 152 (2006): 66 
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B. 1994 Assault Weapon Ban and its Implications on U.S. Gun Legislation and 
Violence 
 
On September 13, 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994; under Title XI – Firearms, this act contained the Public Safety 
and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, referred to as the Federal Assault 
Weapons Ban which was signed by then-President Bill Clinton.46 Here, the Federal 
Assault Weapons Ban ties into the jurisprudence of the previous section, for the ban 
stands as the last attempt at substantive, national firearm regulation before the ruling of 
D.C. v Heller. Following the new precedent in Heller and McDonald, it is challenging for 
the federal government to enact national firearm regulations without infringing on one’s 
constitutional rights. While it is presently hard to pass something to the same degree as 
the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, the Court made clear in Heller that “the Second 
Amendment right is not unlimited;”47 as a result, there is a broad scope of possible 
measures the American government could take to regulate gun ownership rather than 
outright stripping certain guns from the hands of all gun owners. Altogether, this section 
studies the effectiveness of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban and teases out flaws the 
ban had that prevented it from operating substantially better.  
First and foremost under section 110102, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban made it 
illegal for a person “to manufacture, transfer, or possess a semi-automatic assault 
weapon.”48 However, this first clause did not apply to the possession or transfer of any 
semi-automatic assault weapon that was lawfully possessed on the date of the act’s 
enactment and to any unlawful firearms specified in Appendix A of the act that were 
 
46 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. Rep. No. 103-3355, at 201 (1994). 
47 554 U.S. 571 (2008). 
48 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. Rep. No. 103-3355, at 201 (1994). 
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manufactured on October 1, 1993.49 In defining a semi-automatic assault weapon, the act 
stated “any of the firearms or copies or duplicates of the firearms in any caliber, known 
as…” which then proceeded to cherry-pick the names of roughly nineteen gun models.50 
Further, it concluded its list of unlawful guns by banning semi-automatic rifles, pistols, 
and shotguns with the ability to accept a detachable magazine along with at least two 
modifications to the gun, such as a folding or telescoping stock, or a pistol grip that 
protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, to name a few regulations.51 
On the whole, by cherry-picking the types of gun models that would be banned, the 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban assumes that these nineteen models are the largest cause of 
mass shootings. The flaw here, however, is that the ban narrowly defined semi-automatic 
assault weapons and restricted the definition to only nineteen gun models; therefore, gun 
manufacturers could slightly alter the make of gun to circumvent the ban. 
Afterwards, in section 110103, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban prohibited the 
transfer and possession of large capacity ammunition feeding devices, but as with section 
110102, the new law did not apply to the possession or transfer of large capacity 
ammunition feeding devices on or before the date of enactment.52 While it is problematic 
for the overall potency of the gun regulation that the law did not apply to guns purchased 
before the date of enactment, it is impossible to make possible in the U.S. as it would 
constitute an ex post facto law. Consequently, large capacity ammunition feeding devices 
were defined as “a magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or similar device manufactured after 
the date of enactment… that has a capacity of, or that can be readily restored or converted 
 
49 Id at 202.  
50 Id at 202-3. 
51 Id at 203.  
52 Id at 204. 
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to accept, more than 10 rounds of ammunition.”53 In all, before ending the act with an 
appendix of all the gun model names that were banned, section 110105 stipulated that the 
amendments would take effect on the date of the enactment of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and would be repealed ten years after said date.54 
In analyzing both the benefits and shortcomings of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, 
this thesis looks to the flawed nature of the ban before moving on to discuss its actual 
implications on gun violence and culture. Writing immediately after the passage of the 
ban in 1994, Craig Albert, an associate law professor at Seton Hall University in the 
1990s, argued that the assault weapons ban would not work due to a major loophole in 
the substance of the law that assured there would be no federal prosecutions for assault 
weapon possession.55 Because the law held that it was legal for citizens to possess or 
transfer an assault weapon that was lawfully owned preceding the passage of the ban, the 
U.S. government would have to prove the entire chain of custody of the weapon in 
question, yet there is no national recordkeeping requirement for gun sales at a federal 
level making it burdensome for law enforcement to identify offenders.56 Furthermore, the 
expiration of the ban ten years after its enactment also debilitates the effectiveness of the 
assault weapons ban as it only acted as a ten-year ban on the manufacture and 
importation of said weapons.57 In reality, the restrictions on the Federal Assault Weapons 
Ban’s effectiveness resulted from the pro-gun lobby groups and politicians that forced the 
ban to retain numerous caveats restricting its increased success. On top of the flaws 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id at 205. 
55 Craig J. Albert, “Assault Weapons Ban Just Won’t Work,” The New York Times, September 16, 1994, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/16/opinion/l-assault-weapons-ban-just-won-t-work-
260967.html?module=inline. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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mentioned by Albert, the gravest error of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban was failing to 
put forth an accurate, concise definition of assault weapons that could apply across the 
board to all gun manufacturers, so instead, the lawmakers had to pick and choose which 
models and brands would be excluded.58  
This was not the first time historically that a failure to define assault weapons had 
muddled gun control policy and led to loopholes in the legislation rendering it not as 
effective. In writing in 1992 on the nature of assault weapons and the NRA’s enormous 
strength in molding public opinion towards them, Josh Sugarmann argued that the 
increased popularity of semi-automatic assault weapons appealed to the worst instincts of 
gun owners following the Stockton massacre in 1989.59 Here, Patrick Purdy, who was a 
24 year old with an extensive history of drugs and weapons, entered Stockton’s 
Cleveland Elementary School armed with an AK-47 and a 9mm Taurus pistol killing five 
children and wounding 29 others.60 Purdy had legally purchased the AK-47 in Oregon 
and purchased the pistol in California; since he had never committed a felony, he was 
able to purchase these guns with no red flags raised about his criminal behavior.61 As a 
result, following the events of Stockton, assault weapons became entrenched in debate 
that led to a stalemate in policy as the NRA challenged any ordinance passed towards 
stricter gun laws. 
While semi-automatic firearms could be purchased as easily as a hunting rifle since 
they did not fall under the National Firearms Act, their massive capacity to kill and their 
 
58 Asher Stockler, “Clinton-Era Assault Weapons Ban Did Work, According to New Research,” Newsweek, 
September 28, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/assault-weapons-ban-1994-gun-rights-1461951. 
59 Josh Sugarmann, National Rifle Association: Money-Firepower-Fear (District of Columbia: Violence 
Policy Center, 1992) 202. 
60 Id 201. 
61 Id 202. 
 Leone 19 
appeal to paramilitary groups, gang members, and drug dealers led to public outcry for 
restrictions on the nature of semi-automatic weapons.62 While the NRA continued to 
crush any legislation from arising in Congress that would limit semi-automatic weapons 
rights by sending politically charged warnings to their base of supporters, the DeConcini 
bill, drafted by Arizona Democrat Dennis DeConcini, was raised in 1990 calling for the 
ban of nine specifically named foreign and domestic assault weapons.63 By specifically 
naming the brands and makes of assault weapons that would be banned, the bill could 
easily be circumvented if companies developed slightly different guns with different 
names, so when voted upon in May 1990, the bill was swiftly defeated.64 Nonetheless, 
this error of failing to define semi-automatic weapons and instead naming models and 
brands that would be banned was reiterated in the Federal Assault Weapons Ban four 
years later. Taking this into account, in determining the future of gun policy in the U.S., 
politicians should be cognizant that watered down legislation will do nothing to fix the 
issue of gun violence. On the other end, extreme gun control policies that attempt to ball 
all guns, not just semi-automatic or automatic weapons, are also infeasible as they violate 
Second Amendment rights. Thus, policies have to be pursued that allow gun owners to 
maintain their right while also making sure that firearms are properly regulated as to not 
be utilized for mass shootings or incessant violence.  
The federal government in 1993 also attempted to prevent the rapid sale of guns to 
citizens who constituted a potential threat by enacting the Brady Act, which required 
federally licensed firearms dealers to conduct background check on all potential firearm 
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purchasers.65 This tied into the pre-Heller view of the Second Amendment, for the 
government was allowed to regulate civilian’s ownership of firearms without infringing 
upon Second Amendment rights. To comply with the Brady Act, the FBI instituted the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), a centralized category of 
national records that contains information about individuals’ criminal and mental health 
histories as well as any civil order entered against them that may affect their eligibility of 
buying or owning a gun.66  
Lastly, in light of both the legal language of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban and 
arguments against its effectiveness, this thesis now analyzes statistical data conducted by 
John Donohue and Theodora Boulouta in 2019 which determines the influence that the 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban had in reducing the extent of gun violence and mass 
shootings in the U.S.67 In defining a mass shooting as an incident where a gunman 
massacres at least six people in public while excluding crimes of armed robbery and gang 
or domestic violence, they found that compared with the decade before the Federal 
Assault Weapons Ban’s adoption there was a 25% drop in gun massacres (from eight to 
six) and a 40% drop in fatalities (from 81 to 49) during the period of the ban.68 Since 
assault weapons are legal in 43 states and large-capacity magazines capable of holding 
more than 10 rounds are legal in 41 states, it is evident that the ban impeded the easy 
access to this lethal weaponry.69 Now, despite overall violent crime rates descending in 
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the U.S., the proliferation of incredibly powerful assault weapons a decade after the 
expiration of the ban has been met with a baffling 347% increase in fatalities in gun 
massacres.70 More shockingly, in the past five years since 2014, the average number of 
people who die in a gun massacre has increased by 81%, and at least 234 of the 271 
people who have died in gun massacres since 2014 were killed by weapons previously 
prohibited under the federal assault weapons ban as 11 of the 15 gun massacres have 
involved an assault weapon.71 Based on the success of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban 
in reducing the prevalence and magnitude of mass shootings in the U.S., Donohue and 
Boulouta conclude: 
“We should enact a comprehensive federal assault weapons ban and limit on high-capacity 
magazines, repeal the federal immunity statute and create a more comprehensive and effective 
background check and red-flag system to ensure that the growing power of advanced weaponry is 
not readily available to dangerous individuals.”72 
 
Clearly, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban succeeded in alleviating the loss of life caused 
by the spreading and misuse of semi-automatic weapons. Though the ban retained certain 
flaws that the pro-gun politicians and lobbyists infused it with, the radically heightened 
degree and breadth of mass shootings and their lethality in the present day proves that 
some degree of imperfect regulation is better than nothing at all. The question remains, 
however, why there have been no substantive attempts at increasing regulation. 
Ultimately, this issue boils down to the state of politics in the U.S. With radical gun 
rights groups on one side and extremist gun control groups on the other constantly 
attracting the most attention, it is challenging for policies to be pursued that strike 
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between the two sides, for these extremes are what draw the most media attention and 
guide public debates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. The Current State of Gun Violence and Policy in the U.S.  
 
The United States ranks first in the world for private firearm ownership with an 
estimated total number of civilian guns, both licit and illicit, ranging from 265,000,000 to 
393,347,000 as of 2017 figures.73 In taking into account population differences by 
comparing the rate of civilian firearm possession per 100 people in the U.S. and 
Australia, Australia pales in comparison to the United States, which boasts a rate of 120.5 
privately owned firearms per 100 people to Australia’s 13.7 per 100.74,75 This alone 
suggests an immense cultural difference. Lacking a Second Amendment equivalent, 
Australia has managed to enact radically stricter gun laws than the United States without 
the possibility of the High Court of Australia striking it down on some constitutional 
claim. 
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Figure 1.76 
As of 2020 so far, the United States retains no federal laws “banning semi-automatic 
weapons, military-style .50 caliber rifles, handguns, or large-capacity magazines,” and in 
relation to this it also has the highest homicide-by-firearm rate among the world’s most 
developed nations.77 With a lack of federal regulations on firearms, states retain the right 
to regulate firearms within the scope of the Second Amendment. Subsequently, in 
spelling out these disparities between different states’ regulations on firearms, it is first 
important to note that from 1991 to 2016 there was an observed 57% increase in the 
number of enacted state firearm provisions nationwide; however, this increase can only 
be attributed to the actions of a few states (CT, CA, MA, MD, and NY) as most other 
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states only had slight increases, and sixteen states even repealed more provisions than 
were enacted.78 This speaks wonders to the failure of numerous states in combating gun 
violence and monitoring the backgrounds of individuals who purchase a gun, for in some 
states an individual is capable of purchasing a semi-automatic rifle in less than 10 
minutes.79 
The main way the government regulates which individuals can purchase a gun is 
through a background check enforced by the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System. Under the Brady Bill, all licensed sellers are required to conduct a 
background check of potential buyers before selling them a firearm. The largest flaw with 
the federal background check requirement, however, is that it allows unlicensed sellers, 
whether online, at gun shows, or anywhere else without a federal dealer’s license, to 
transfer firearms without running any background check and with no questions asked.80 
This is a problem because guns are not toys; if individuals attempt to purchase guns who 
are prohibited from doing so due to criminal charges, sellers should know this to avoid 
giving guns to dangerous individuals. With an estimated 22% of U.S. gun owners 
acquiring their most recent firearm without any background check, this means that 
millions of Americans are stockpiling millions of guns without any regulation on the 
character and history of the gun owner.81 On top of this, 80% of all firearms bought with 
the intent of committing criminal actions are done so through unlicensed sellers, and 96% 
of criminals with previous gun offenses that are prohibited from possessing a firearm are 
 
78 Jane McClenathan, Molly Pahn and Michael Siegel, “The Changing Landscape of U.S. Gun Policy: State 
Firearm Laws, 1991-2016,” Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2016, vii. 
79 See Helen Ubinas, “I bought an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle in Philly in 7 minutes,” The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, June 13, 2016. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/columnists/helen_ubinas. 
80 Giffords Law Center, “Universal Background Checks,” 2019. 
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able to easily circumvent the background check as a result of unlicensed sellers’ lack of 
questioning or regulation.82 While 21 states including Washington D.C. have extended 
the background check requirement beyond federal law to private sales in varying degrees, 
the other remaining 29 states have failed to reconcile the issue. This dichotomy of each 
state’s gun legislation is the driving factor preventing consequential action from being 
taken to reduce mass shootings in the U.S.  
Figure 2. Firearm-related mortality rates, legislative strength scores, and total firearm deaths in the United States, 2007 through 
2010.83 
The states with the least laws had an absolute rate difference of 6.64 firearm-related 
deaths/100,000 per year compared to 0.40 firearm-related deaths/100,000 per year in 
states with the most laws.84 While the question of culture at a national level is critical in 
juxtaposing the U.S. with Australia, it is important not to underplay the culture and 
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attitudes towards firearms at a state level, for Fleegler et al. notes that differences in 
states’ culture “may confound the association between firearm ownership and firearm 
legislation.”85 
Altogether, the current state of gun violence and policy in the United States is one of 
continued violence with trivial policy responses. Nevertheless, recent public opinion polls 
by Pew Research are fairly telling of how Americans are shifting towards a mindset of 
supporting some gun regulations.86As reproduced in the chart below, the majority of 
individuals from both conservative and liberal backgrounds support gun regulations that 
prevent mentally ill individuals from buying guns, require background checks at private 
sales, and bar people who are on federal no-fly watch lists from buying a gun.87 Even 
though both sides cannot come to an agreement on all aspects of firearm regulation, it’s 
important to capitalize on this area of agreement to pursue policies that make guns safer 
without infringing on one’s rights. However, despite public opinion showing one thing, 
it’s important to take into account the powerful actors that shape the gun control debate 
such as the NRA. By embodying these partisan interests that may run counter to public 
opinion, the NRA uses its political clout to staunchly defend a hardline view of the 
Second Amendment.  
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Altogether, the concern is at what point will our American government and all of its 
citizens come together as a unified front to tackle this issue? While Americans struggle to 
combat this issue on their home front, it is obvious the tweets of “thoughts and prayers to 
the victims’ families” will not reconcile the problem, so American politicians must 
reexamine the laws and culture while looking towards neighboring countries to figure out 
 Leone 28 
what concrete coping mechanisms may work.88 In the present leadup to the 2020 
Presidential Election, many Democratic candidates had established plans for gun control. 
With Joe Biden as the Democratic candidate, he has previously expressed interest in 
pushing to create universal background check, to reinstate the assault weapons ban, and 
to enact a voluntary buyback program of assault weapons.89 As the election rapidly 
approaches, it will be interesting to see if gun control is raised in any manner throughout 
debates and if any substantive action is achieved following the election’s results. 
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Chapter II: Down Under! The History of Australian Gun Violence 
 
A. History of Gun Legislation and Violence in Australia before Port Arthur  
 
Before analyzing Australia’s unique history of gun legislation, violence, and culture, 
it is necessary to lay out the scholarly understanding of what defines a mass shooting. In 
briefly clarifying how the definition of a mass shooting has evolved through time, Philip 
Alpers explains how a mass shooting was understood in the 1990s:  
“The common definition of a ‘mass shooting’ in 1996 was five or more victims killed by gunshot 
in proximate events in a civilian setting, not including any perpetrator(s) killed by their own hand 
or otherwise. This excludes most of Australia’s more common firearm-related spousal and family 
violence killings.”90 
 
Since 2013, the United States has reduced the general baseline for mass shootings in 
Public Law 112-265 to “three or more killings in a single incident” following President 
Obama’s authorization of the act.91,92 It is important for this thesis to clarify the 
commonly understood definition of a mass shooting as it is a narrowly defined term that 
ignores domestic firearm violence and firearm-related suicide. In line with this 
interpretation of mass shootings, this thesis will only briefly cover the impact of mass 
shootings in domestic settings and will leave it up to future research.   
Unlike the United States of America, the trajectory of gun legislation, violence, and 
culture in Australia is an entirely different story. Before the events of the Port Arthur 
Massacre on April 28, 1996, Australia’s history of mass shootings was one of intense 
violence and government inaction, which closely resembles the United States’ past and 
 
90 Id. 
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present dilemma with gun violence. From 1980 up until, but not including, the Port 
Arthur Massacre, there were 13 mass shootings that took a combined 82 lives.93 Of these 
13 mass shootings, nine involved men shooting people they knew previously with the 
remaining four consisting of gunmen in public places killing total strangers.94 Juxtaposed 
with the U.S., from 1982-1996 in the United States, there was a total of 21 mass 
shootings that afflicted the U.S. nation claiming a total of 173 lives.95 Of these shootings, 
two resulted in more than 20 civilian fatalities in one setting: The San Ysidro 
McDonald’s Massacre96 and The Luby’s Massacre.97 Despite the United States having a 
population nearly fifteen times that of Australia during this time period, on a per capita 
basis of mass homicides per 100,000 people, mass killings accounted for a larger share of 
total homicide-related deaths in Australia than in the United States.98 Instead of ignoring 
the underlying issues of firearm violence at hand in their society and thinking that law 
reform would be inevitable, Australians employed the “strategic use of media and other 
forms of advocacy to convert anger and outrage into action.”99 
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 Gun control advocacy in Australia did not emerge out of the blue following the 
Port Arthur Massacre; it had been slowly growing for decades beforehand. Following the 
murders of Margaret Bacsa and Ella Rosvoll in the late 1960s in Victoria, the Committee 
to Register all Guns was set up by members of the public to combat what they viewed as 
a growing problem.100 In the years that followed, public advocacy of gun control in 
Australia persisted to gain steam with groups like the Council to Control Gun Misuse in 
Victoria attempting to lobby the state government in the early 1980s.101 By the time of 
the Port Arthur Massacre, Coalitions for Gun Control had already been established in 
three of the Australian states: Tasmania, Victoria, and New South Wales.102 Simon 
Chapman charts this progression of public opinion and depicts, “These years of 
advocacy, supplemented by efforts from a diverse range of health, legal, academic, 
church, trade union, women’s and community groups, had established widespread public 
support for the main platforms of gun control.”103 As seen within the public opinion polls 
of Table 1 reproduced below, public support for gun control across Australia was 
exceptionally high both before and after the Port Arthur Massacre. 
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Table 1: Australian Surveys of Community Opinion About Gun Control104 
 
 Why then was there no substantial action undertaken on a national scale in 
Australia to counteract the publicly recognized issue of gun violence? As Australia’s gun 
policy remained stagnant, countries across the globe were implementing gun control 
measures. In November 1988, the United Kingdom implemented the Firearms 
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(Amendment) Act 1988 banning some “specially dangerous weapons”105 immediately 
following the Hungerford massacre in August 1987.106 Similarly, the Canadian 
Government passed gun registration laws tightening control of firearms in 1995.107 Even 
the United States enacted some degree of national gun control before Australia as the 
1994 Assault Weapons Ban was passed restricting the sale of newly manufactured or 
imported assault rifles.108  
 The problem in passing national uniform firearm legislation in Australia was a 
result of the division of powers between the states and the territories, and the national 
government. As Alpers and Ghazarian note, “State and territory governments hold 
constitutional authority over the provision of law and order, while the Commonwealth 
has authority to ban the importation of firearms under its customs regulations.”109 The 
Australian Constitution spells out this separation of powers between state and territory 
governments and the national government. In Chapter V of the Australian Constitution, 
the power of state parliaments is reserved,110 and the legitimacy of a state’s laws is 
upheld as long as it is not “inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth.”111 In the 
context of firearm legislation however, it was impossible for a state’s gun laws to be 
“inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth,” for the Australian Parliament did not 
have this power vested in the Constitution. Under the section entitled “Powers of the 
Parliament” in the Australian Constitution, the Australian Parliament has powers ranging 
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from trade and commerce to astrological and meteorological observations, yet nowhere is 
it included that the Australian Parliament has the power to regulate firearms.112 Further, 
unlike the United States’ right to bear arms being embedded in the Second Amendment, 
Australian citizens did not have an equivalent right under the Commonwealth 
Constitution that preserved their right to bear arms.113 Resultantly, firearm legislation 
varied across the states and territories before Port Arthur. Depending on the state, 
ammunition sales were largely unrestricted, semi-automatic weapons were legal, and 
registration of most firearms was not required.114 Overall, despite the best efforts of some 
states in counteracting the issue of gun violence with regulation, it was the ineptitude of 
others that prevented any substantive national degree of regulation from being enacted. 
 Before the aftermath of Port Arthur in 1996, gun control laws intensely varied 
between Australian states. While states like Western Australia, New South Wales, South 
Australia, and Victoria took action to regulate firearms, states like Queensland and 
Tasmania took no action at all. In regulating firearms, Roger Douglas expresses the 
central regulative devices that states would employ:  
“The major regulatory devices include provisions for licensing of shooters, requirements that firearms 
be registered and that transfers of ownership be notified to the Registrar, requirements that people 
acquiring particular firearms possess permits in relation to those firearms, rules restricting access to 
particular kinds of firearms, and rules with respect to the training of shooters and the safe-keeping of 
firearms. In general, regimes whose rules are restrictive in some respects are restrictive in others.”115 
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For example, since 1931, Western Australia required licenses for each firearm; it 
proceeded to strengthen its legislation in 1974 and required that “licensees have good 
reason for being licensed.”116 On top of this, in 1981, Western Australia also restricted 
the access to semi-automatic weapons.117 In a similar manner, New South Wales 
introduced a shooter’s license requirement in 1975 before continuing to augment the 
1975 “fit and proper requirement” with a “good reasons” requirement in 1986.118 New 
South Wales even prepared to set up a registration system in 1988, but it was inevitably 
repealed following the change in state government.119 These endeavors on the part of 
some states in enacting firearm regulation laws is worth mentioning here, for their efforts 
were not matched on a uniform basis across Australia. In Queensland and Tasmania, the 
law surrounding firearms remained almost completely unchanged with only some slight 
adjustments to the extent of people forbidden from owning a gun. Before the 1990s, 
neither Queensland nor Tasmania required a license to own a gun, 120 making it incredibly 
easy for potentially dangerous individuals to buy guns and bring them across state lines 
where a more stringent state’s laws would have prevented them from completing the 
purchase. 
 It was not until December 22, 1987, when the Australian Commonwealth finally 
attempted to face the issue of gun violence head-on. Prime Minister Bob Hawke of the 
Australian Labor Party had been in power since 1983. During his time as prime minister, 
Australia was reeling from several high-profile mass shootings in the late 1980s and early 
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1990s. Most notably, the shock from the Hoddle Street killings121 in Melbourne of 
August 1987 and the Queen Street killings,122 also in Melbourne, of December 1987 
finally managed to push the national government into attempted action.123 On December 
22, 1987, Prime Minister Bob Hawke convened a National Gun Summit hoping to 
achieve a consensus on national gun laws or a possible national ban on military-style 
semi-automatic weapons.124 Nonetheless, the conference was a failure as no consensus 
was reached due to Queensland and Tasmania’s refusal to participate in a national 
agreement.125 Frustrated about this policy stalemate, the New South Wales Premier at the 
time, Barrie Unsworth, left the National Gun Summit in 1987 ironically claiming, “It will 
take a massacre in Tasmania before we get gun law reform in Australia.”126 Despite the 
growing salience of high-profile mass shootings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was 
this opposition from a minority of Australian states that prevented the majority from 
undertaking any national action towards regulating firearms.  
 The National Gun Summit did however spur a new wave of research about 
firearms and violence in Australia. Conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology 
in February 1988, the first major study regarding the availability of firearms in Australia 
attempted to provide basic information and statistics about firearm availability before 
 
121 On August 9, 1987, 19-year-old Julian Knight shot at passing cars from a nature strip on Hoddle Street 
killing 7 people and injuring 19 others before being caught. 
122 On December 8, 1987, 22-year-old Frank Vitkovic visited a former friend in an office building before he 
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building after his gun was wrestled away by civilians present.  
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considering policy options.127 For starters, the survey acknowledged the lack of 
“accurate, reliable, uniform and timely statistical data on the availability of firearms in 
Australia and their use in crime.”128 In an attempt to reconcile this lack of information 
about firearms, the study estimated that there was “at least 3.5 million guns of all types – 
registered, unregistered, licensed and unlicensed, in the hands of private citizens – in 
Australia;”129 similar to the United States’ present situation where research about 
firearms can only speculate the total number of firearms because of the lack of a national 
registration system, Australian firearm researchers also had a challenging time 
deciphering the total number of firearms in circulation due to the same issue. 
Furthermore, the study also discovered that more than a quarter of all Australian 
households were found to possess a gun with Queensland and Tasmania having the 
highest percentage of armed households.130 It’s unsurprising that Queensland and 
Tasmania had the highest rates of gun ownership as prospective gun buyers in these two 
states were not required at the time to go through any licensing or training procedure 
before purchasing a gun. Because of these nonexistent regulations in Queensland and 
Tasmania, the rationale was that stricter laws would effectively achieve some substantive 
decline in the states that had stricter legislation, yet in comparing the rates of gun 
violence between states, Roger Douglas found that more stringent measures may not 
correlate to less gun violence in a state.131 
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 A separate study conducted by Roger Douglas in 1997 sought to scrutinize the 
role that stricter state legislation had in lowering firearm violence in said state. 
Juxtaposing the lax laws of Queensland and Tasmania against the tougher regulations of 
the other states, Douglas compared “the death rates and percentage gun use measures in 
the states in which the law has changed with rates in states in which the law stayed more 
or less constant, namely Queensland and Tasmania.”132 On the whole, Douglas found 
that: 
“The data provide some support for the proposition that stricter gun homicide laws affect gun 
homicide rates, less for the proposition that they affect the degree to which guns are used in 
homicides and none to suggest that stricter laws affect overall homicide rates. They provide 
slightly stronger support for the proposition that stricter laws reduce gun suicides and the use of 
guns in suicides (except in the Northern Territory), but none to suggest that they affect overall 
suicide rates. Stricter laws do not appear to affect gun accident death rates.”133 
Hence, in dividing the average annual death rates and gun death percentages of states by 
their Queensland equivalent, Table 2 illustrates Douglas’ conclusion that the proliferation 
and deregulated nature of firearms in Queensland did not entail more firearm violence in 
Queensland than most other states with more regulative schemes:134 
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 With regard to Douglas’ final claims, while it is statistically true that less firearm 
regulations did not necessarily result in more gun violence in Queensland compared to 
the stricter states, Douglas’ argument ignores a critical factor of gun regulation 
emphasized by the Australian Institute of Criminology: uniformity of regulation. Even 
though it was mentioned earlier how New South Wales was one of few Australian states 
that took extensive measures to regulate firearms and firearm sales, homicides committed 
with a firearm in 1986 constituted a 44.2 per cent majority of all total murders reported to 
police in New South Wales.135 To comprehend why states with stricter gun laws still 
experienced high levels of gun violence, Chappell et al. explain that it is the lack of 
effective enforcement and uniformity in Australia’s national gun laws that causes the 
negligence of one state to neutralize the constructive efforts of others.136  
Before Port Arthur, the police forces of each state took drastically different ways 
of administering the firearms laws, so Chappell et al. portray, “Standard operating 
procedures for all Australian police forces would enhance the possibility of an effective 
enforcement system.137 Moreover, they acknowledge that the total disappearance of 
firearms from Australia would not eliminate violence; however, a reduction in firearm 
numbers and further restrictions on the availability of firearms on a uniform scale would 
reduce considerable death and injury.138 The issue of different firearm legislation from 
one state to the next is that, as was the case in 1987, a weapon purchased legally in 
Queensland was used to kill people in the Northern Territory and Western Australia 
where legislation in these victim states would have prevented the buyer from purchasing 
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said weapon.139 Altogether, the recognition of a need for universal firearms laws “poised 
[Australia] on the brink of change with regard to its firearms policies,” but it would not 
be until the atrocity of Port Arthur where this change would finally come to fruition. 
 Although no national measures were taken, following the National Gun Summit 
most states, including Tasmania and Queensland, did make some improvements to their 
gun laws. After suffering the Hoddle Street and Queen Street massacres, Victoria 
tightened restrictions on semi-automatic long-arms.140 As was previously mentioned, 
New South Wales tried to overhaul its gun laws between 1985 and 1988 by implementing 
a gun registration system but did so to no avail; the interesting aspect of New South 
Wales’ proposed registration system is that a very similar scheme would eventually be 
adopted nationally following the Port Arthur Massacre.141 Finally, Queensland in 1990 
and Tasmania in 1991 passed similar laws that were the first of their kind in these states 
regulating rifles and shotguns and requiring a license to own or buy guns.142 The National 
Gun Summit of 1987 began the steadier push towards gun regulation. While Tasmania 
and Queensland had made progress at the state level, their new licensing requirements 
were still flawed as it did not require buyers to demonstrate a good reason for wanting a 
license and also allowed a license to be valid for life.143 In sum, in spite of Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke’s best attempts at corralling the states into a uniform set of firearm 
regulations, the discrepancies between states’ policies left holes in the national system 
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that were only met with increased violence as the Australian Commonwealth could do 
nothing but plead for action from each and every state.  
 Consequently, the issue of firearm legislation haunted PM Hawke and 
overshadowed his government’s policy agenda.144 After 11 more people were killed in 
mass shootings in Sydney between August 1990 and August 1991, the media interest in 
the government’s response to this crisis was intense.145 Then, in August 1991, Hawke 
lamented on national television about the national government’s inability to take any 
action; Hawke affirmed: 
“[U]nder the Constitution it requires the action and laws of the State governments and what 
I’m saying to you is that due to a lack of political will within the states the governments that 
have got the responsibility who must pass the laws won’t do it… I can’t change the 
Constitution. I have not got the constitutional power to pass laws.”146  
 
All in all, Hawke reminded the Australia public that gun control, was a power that could 
be exercised by the states not the Commonwealth Government.147 Despite demonstrating 
initiative to push for change, Hawke lost the support of the Australian Labor Party, and 
Paul Keating assumed the role of prime minister in December 1991.148 Like Hawke, PM 
Paul Keating could not ensure uniform gun laws even as political pressure intensified 
with more gun violence in Sydney of August 1993.149 Eventually, in March 1996, the 
federal election was held, and the Australian Labor Party lost 31 of its seats ending its 13 
years in power.150 In place of Keating, John Howard of the Liberal Party won by a 
landslide claiming 94 seats.151 While neither major party promised uniform gun laws 
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during this 1996 election, the impact of the Port Arthur Massacre one month after the 
federal election would demand action.  
 This section has gone to great lengths in detailing the confusing and jumbled 
nature of firearm legislation in each of Australia’s states and territories. In relating this 
pre-Port Arthur history and structure of gun laws to the current situation in the United 
States, it’s clear that the U.S. presently suffers from the same lack of universal firearm 
legislation across the country. Without proper, systematic regulation on the national level, 
it makes it easier for disqualified buyers to travel to a state with less regulations and 
acquire a gun with neither a background check nor training.152 Following the Port Arthur 
Massacre, Australia determined that it was about time to deal with these discrepancies in 
each state’s respective system by bringing them all together under one universal system. 
 
B. Port Arthur Massacre and its Implications on Gun Legislation and Violence 
 
Port Arthur, located in the Australian province of Tasmania, is the site of a historic 
landmark of Australian culture.153 From 1833 to 1877, it served as a prison for the most 
dangerous criminals that had broken the law again after already being shipped out of 
Britain for breaking the law there.154 Now, Port Arthur is maintained by the Australian 
Government and is a reminder of Australia’s roots as a penal colony. 
On April 28, 1996, Martin Bryant, a 28-year-old with a history of violence and 
mental illness, travelled to the historic site of Port Arthur killing 35 people and severely 
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injuring 18 individuals in less than 24 hours.155 Though he used an AR-15, capable of 
shooting 30 rounds before reloading, and a FN FAL, a semi-automatic rifle able to fire up 
to 700 rounds a minute, to commit this destruction, Martin Bryant had legally purchased 
these weapons leading up to the shooting.156 After an overnight standoff with the 
Tasmanian police, Martin Bryant, in a fit, set the house he was camped in on fire the next 
morning around 8:00am.157 Running out of the house with his clothes on fire, Bryant was 
handcuffed and arrested by police before being sentenced at trial to 35 life sentences 
without the possibility of parole as Australia does not have laws supporting capital 
punishment.158 To this day, he is imprisoned in Risdon Prison in Tasmania and is under 
intense security monitoring to ensure he does commit suicide.159 
Immediately after the shooting, the event generated immense media attention with 
news outlets describing the massacre as “the worst massacre by a single gunman in the 
Australian history” and Martin Bryant as “the world’s worst lone mass killer.”160 As a 
result, the aftermath of Port Arthur was met with an unprecedented outpouring of national 
grief and anger. Particularly, Australians expressed frustration over the fact that 
Australia’s weak firearm regulations continued to grant individuals access to rapid-fire, 
military-style weapons like the ones Martin Bryant utilized.161 Only having been in office 
for 57 days, Prime Minister John Howard responded forcefully the day after the murders 
declaring his intention to introduce the “most sweeping gun control reforms ever 
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contemplated by the Australian government.”162 Having witnessed the inability of the 
national government to create effective firearm legislation in the decades before 
becoming prime minister, Howard had always been critical of Australia’s gun laws. 
During his time as opposition leader in 1995, Howard made powerful claims about his 
desire to stop Australia from copying what he deemed as American gun culture; John 
Howard said: 
“I am firmly on the side of those who believe that it would be a cardinal tragedy if Australia did 
not learn the bitter lessons of the United States regarding guns. I have no doubt that the horrific 
homicide level in the United States is directly related to the plentiful supply of guns ... Whilst 
making proper allowances for legitimate sporting and recreational activities and the proper needs 
of our rural community, every effort should be made to limit the carrying of guns in Australia.”163 
 
This rhetoric of avoiding a similar gun culture like that of the United States became a 
central element of all advocacy for new gun laws, for political leaders, media 
commentators, and even the general public demanded that Australia “must not to go 
down the American path” of gun violence and culture.164 Although Australia’s police 
ministers had met 20 times since 1980 to talk through uniform national gun laws, their 
meetings always resulted in a lack of comprehensive national laws;165 the potency of the 
Port Arthur killings pushed this standstill over the edge. 
 Prime Minister John Howard recognized that the Port Arthur Massacre provided 
an opportunity for action, and Howard later explained: 
“You never let a good crisis go to waste ... you do have to recognize that sometimes a crisis forces 
people to focus on something ... tragic though the event was, it gave us an opportunity to do 
something in the wake of it, so that those lives were not lost in vain.”166 
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Therefore, in 12 days, the Howard Government meticulously persisted with its firearm 
reform policy until it reached an agreement with the states and territories to introduce 
national uniform gun laws.167 On May 10, 1996, at the Australasian Police Ministers’ 
Council (APMC), the National Firearms Agreement was agreed upon committing every 
state and territory to pass laws in line with the demands of the resolution. The National 
Firearms Agreement required: 
1. A ban on the importation, ownership, sale, resale, transfer, possession, manufacture or use of:  
• all self-loading center-fire rifles, whether military-style or not  
• all self-loading and pump-action shotguns  
• all self-loading rim-fire rifles.  
o Exemptions for low-powered (rim-fire) self-loading .22s and pump-action 
shotguns would be available to primary producers (farmers) who could satisfy 
police that they had a ‘genuine need’ which could not be achieved by some other 
means, or by non-prohibited weapons. A further exemption was added later to 
permit some clay target shooters to own a semi-automatic shotgun. No other 
‘sporting’ or competitive use of semi-automatic long-arms was to be allowed.  
2. A compensatory ‘buyback’ scheme funded through an increase in the Medicare levy, whereby 
gun owners would be paid the market value of any prohibited guns they handed in. Owners of 
prohibited weapons would have 12 months to surrender their guns. After this amnesty, 
penalties for illegal ownership would be severe.  
3. The registration of all firearms as part of an integrated shooter licensing scheme, maintained 
through the computerized National Exchange of Police Information (NEPI).  
4. Shooter licensing based on a requirement to prove a ‘genuine reason’ for owning a firearm. 
Genuine reason could include occupational uses such as stock and vermin control on farms; 
demonstrated membership of an authorized target shooting club; or hunting when the 
applicant could provide permission from a rural landowner. The APMC agreement explicitly 
ruled out ‘personal protection’ or self-defense as a genuine reason to own a gun.  
5. A licensing scheme based on five categories of firearms (A, B, C, D, H), minimum age of 18, 
and criteria for a ‘fit and proper person’. These criteria would include compulsory 
cancellation or refusal of licenses to people who have been convicted for violence or subject 
to a domestic violence restraining order within the past five years.  
6. New license applicants would need to undertake an accredited training course in gun safety.  
7. As well as a license to own firearms, a separate permit would be required for each purchase of 
a gun. Permit applications would be subject to a 28-day waiting period to allow the licensee’s 
genuine reason to be checked.  
8. Each license applicant has to comply with safe storage requirements by keeping firearms and 
ammunition in separate fixed, locked receptacles, must submit to the inspection of storage by 
authorities and is subject to immediate withdrawal of the license and confiscation of firearms 
for failure to comply.  
9. Firearm sales could be conducted only by or through licensed fire- arms dealers, thus ending 
private and mail order gun sales. Detailed records of all sales would have to be provided to 
police.  
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10. The sale of ammunition would be allowed only for firearms for which the purchaser is 
licensed, and limits would be placed on the quantity of ammunition that may be purchased in 
a given period. 
11. A firearm license may also be refused or cancelled following a conviction involving violence; 
an apprehended violence, domestic violence or restraining order; reliable evidence of mental 
or physical unsuitability to possess a firearm; and for not notifying a change of address.168,169  
Despite the achievement of reaching an agreement on national firearm regulations, 
the process of getting to this end result was not without opposition from the pro-gun 
lobby in Australia. Due to extensive media coverage painting the gun lobby in a harshly 
negative light, Australians were constantly met with stories of belligerent gun-crazed men 
that only wanted to cling to their military-style and rapid-fire weaponry. While this 
framing of the gun lobby ignored the sentimental tradition of hunting in the rural farm 
towns of Australia, it did illustrate gun ownership and hunting as an angry and potentially 
dangerous side of Australian life.170 Responding to these insults, the gun lobby, similar to 
the NRA’s strategy in the United States, repeatedly made clear that it was not responsible 
for the events of Port Arthur and that its members were “decent, law-abiding citizens who 
had and would not harm anyone.”171 Nonetheless, whereas these arguments have 
managed to put off legislative change to firearm laws in the United States, they carried no 
weight in Australia following Port Arthur, and the potency of the general public in 
criticizing and responding to claims from the gun lobby maintained the nation’s outrage 
over what happened and challenged any possibility of inadequate reform.172  
With the massive support of public opinion, PM John Howard did not have to worry 
much about the political strength of the gun lobby. Before the finalization of the National 
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Firearms Agreement, between 83 to 90 percent of the public supported a ban on 
automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and five weeks later on June 11 another poll 
found that 80 per cent of respondents approved of PM Howard’s decision to severely 
restrict the use of automatic and semi-automatic weapons.173 The most challenging issue 
for PM John Howard in enacting uniform national gun regulations was slicing through 
the partisanship of the different states. Just like the United States’ present system of 
varying firearm regulations depending on the state, Australia’s gun laws were 
inconsistent across each state before Port Arthur; this lack of consistency meant 
Australia’s system of gun control was “only as strong as its weakest link,” which in this 
case was Tasmania and Queensland.174 Luckily for Prime Minister Howard, he had the 
advantage of dealing with the disaster as a newly-elected Prime Minister with a massive 
majority in the new Parliament.175 Support of Howard’s proposal spread across party 
lines, for John Howard received immediate backing from the Opposition, which was the 
Australian Labor Party at the time, the Greens, and the Australian Democrats.176 The real 
dilemma for Howard was acquiring the loyalty of Australia’s National Party, the most 
socially and politically conservative party in Australia that had a long record of opposing 
gun law reform.177 In corralling the base of National voters to support reform, PM 
Howard turned to the National Party’s Federal leader, Deputy Prime Minister Tim 
Fischer, who wholesomely supported Howard’s position at the cost of losing his own 
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support within the National Party.178 With this broad base of approval, gun control was a 
mainstream political priority.179  
The final remaining challenge to Howard’s inevitable passing of the National 
Firearms Act was the state and territory governments that had the ultimate say in firearm 
regulations. After the Police Ministers’ meeting on May 10, 1996, Queensland, South 
Australia, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory began prolonged debates and 
lobbying that tried to lessen and ease many of the resolutions, definitions, and 
provisions.180,181 To deal with these belligerent states and territories and to prevent the 
entire resolution from failing, Prime Minister John Howard threatened to hold a national 
referendum if all parties failed to introduce the agreed-upon laws by July 22.182 The 
referendum was going to seek to alter the Australian Constitution so that the power to 
make gun laws would originate from the Commonwealth Government, yet despite 
opinion polls indicating that majority support for the power transfer would be reached, 
the referendum would have also cost the government $50 million and run counter to PM 
Howard’s wish to reach uniformity through “cooperative federalism.”183,184 Before the 
deadline was reached, all states and territories had passed laws in line with the National 
Firearms Agreement effectively changing the gun culture in Australia forever.  
Drawing this section back to the thesis’ central notion of culture, it’s evident that the 
prolonged process of achieving uniform national gun regulations in Australia did not 
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come easily. It was a combination of John Howard’s timeliness, rhetoric, and broad 
support in the federal government that allowed him to swiftly push for change that would 
have been impossible before the events of Port Arthur. Alongside the passionate pleas of 
public opinion for stricter firearm regulations of automatic and semi-automatic weapons, 
John Howard was able to reshape Australia’s culture into one where guns were not 
viewed as a central aspect of what it means to be Australian. Resultantly, since this 
culture shift, Australian has seen a drastic reduction in the amount of violence committed 
with firearms. 
 
C. The Current State of Gun Legislation and Violence in Australia  
 
A central feature of the National Firearms Agreement was its decision to buyback a 
substantial portion of the stockpile of firearms. To ensure its effectiveness, an expert 
committee generated a price list that was used by all states to prevent citizens from 
choosing the highest paying state.185 Australia’s buyback program began in 1996 and was 
completed by September 30, 1997; during this period, citizens handed in a total of 
643,726 prohibited firearms and received the market value for their weapon.186 The total 
public expenditures of the program were roughly $A320 million ($U.S. 230 million), 
which amounted to about $A500 ($U.S. 359) per gun.187 Comparing Australia’s buyback 
program with Clinton’s 1994 Assault Weapons Ban, President Bill Clinton only set aside 
$15 million for the Department of Housing and Urban Development to buy guns from 
public housing residents.188 Here, the issue for the United States was the underfunding of 
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gun buyback programs. Without proper funding, a buyback scheme in the United States 
would only capture an incredible meager percentage of the total number of firearms in 
circulation.189 Thus, Australia managed to finance their program with an additional 0.2 
per cent levy on national health insurance.190 With the cost of the buyback program 
distributed equitably across society, it cost the average taxpayer $15.191  
Following the initial buyback, a series of “rolling amnesties” periods were laid out 
where gun owners could hand over guns that were either prohibited or not registered 
without facing any penalty.192 As represented in Table 3 below, this subsequent wave of 
amnesties brought the total number of firearms collected from the National Firearms 
Agreement to 659,940 by August 2001: 
 
Table 3: Gun Buyback, Totals and Expenditures, by Jurisdiction, August 2001193 
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In combating gun violence, however, Australia’s firearm regulations did not stop 
there. Identifying holes in its firearm regulations, in July 2002, the APMC agreed on the 
National Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement.194 The Trafficking Agreement sought to 
increase border protection, introduce a nationally consistent regulation of the legal 
manufacture of firearms, and establish new offences for illegally possessing or supplying 
firearms as well as defacing a gun’s serial number.195 As a country with no shared land 
borders, this policy effectively took advantage of Australia’s isolation to regulate and 
control the flow of firearms in Australia.196 Later that same year on October 21, a 
shooting incident occurred at Monash University in Melbourne, where a man entered a 
classroom and shot and killed two people while wounding five.197 Since the National 
Firearms Agreement had only covered long-guns, the gunman was legally a  licensed 
pistol owner with several handguns, including semi-automatic pistols and a .357 magnum 
revolver.198 The following day, Prime Minister John Howard once again responded to the 
tragedy and foreshadowed the raising of a new proposal to further strengthen gun laws in 
Australia.199 PM Howard’s stated objective in discussing the issue at the 
intergovernmental level was to see “whether there are additional things we can do to take 
more weapons out of society consistent with protecting the right of sporting shooters in a 
legitimate sense…”200   
 
194 “Legislative Reforms,” Australian Institute of Criminology, November 3, 2017, 
https://aic.gov.au/publications/rpp/rpp116/legislative-reforms. 
195 Id. 
196 Reuter, and Mouzos, “Australia: A Massive Buy Back of Low-Risk Guns,” 125. 
197 Brendan Bailey, “Bills Digest No. 155 2002-03: National Handgun Buyback Bill 2003,” Parliament of 
Australia, May 22, 2003, 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0203/03bd155. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Question without Notice, 'Law Enforcement: Gun Control', Debates, House of Representatives, 22 
October 2002: p. 8229. 
 Leone 53 
By December 2002, the Australian state and territory governments and the 
national government had reached a consensus on the National Handgun Control 
Agreement.201 The NHCA prohibits handguns that have:  
“[1] a caliber that is greater than .38, unless the handgun is used to participate in a specially 
accredited sporting event in that case a caliber of up to .45 will be permitted, [2] a barrel 
length of less than 120 mm for semi-automatic handguns and less than 100 mm for revolvers 
and single-shot handguns, unless the handgun is a highly specialized target pistol, and [3] 
a magazine/shot capacity that exceeds 10 rounds.”202 
 
Using the $15 million left over from the 1996 buyback along with an indicative cost of 
$69 million to the Commonwealth, the states and territories conducted a period of 
handgun buybacks from July 1, 2003, until December 31, 2003.203 When the buyback 
period had ended, the Australian Commonwealth had collected and destroyed 68,727 
handguns, making the overall recorded total of firearms collected since the 1996 buyback 
728,667.204 Realistically, Philip Alpers, who has dedicated his research to Australia’s gun 
policies, has found that this number is not only conservative but also ignorant of the 
firearms that were untallied and unrecognized.205 Alpers affirms that at least 219,721 
additional firearms were given up for destruction as, “Such was the swing in public 
opinion that large numbers of gun owners sent lawfully held firearms to the smelter, even 
when there was no obligation to do so.”206 In the end, as a result of these buyback 
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periods, at least one million privately owned firearms, constituting a third of the 
estimated national stockpile,207 were given up or seized before being melted down.208 
 This thesis has gone to great lengths to display the magnitude of guns the 
Australian Government managed to remove from its country’s total stock. In doing so, 
the central question is whether or not Australia’s buyback programs and restrictive gun 
laws produced any positive effect. Writing before the conclusion of the handgun buyback 
programs, Peter Reuter and Jenny Mouzos were openly critical of the effectiveness of 
Australia’s more restrictive laws and mass purchasing of civilian firearms. They held that 
the total homicide rates had already been declining throughout the 1990s, and the 
National Firearms Agreement did not accelerate this decline in any way.209 Their 
statistics showed that there was a “decline of 8.9 percent in the rate of total homicide and 
a 3.2 percent decline in the daily rate of firearm homicide,” but these declines simply 
“continued a long-term trend.”210 Evidently however, Reuter and Mouzos did concede 
that in the five years between Port Arthur and their study there had been zero firearm 
mass murder incidents in Australia, and the average number of victims to firearm 
violence was smaller than previous mass murders.211 With regard to homicides 
committed with a firearm, the number declined between 1980 and 1995 before falling 
sharply from 1996 to 1999.212 Nonetheless, Reuter and Mouzos conclude that “the results 
[of the National Firearms Agreement] provide little insight [into the effectiveness of gun 
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buyback proposals].”213 Comparing Australia’s buyback program with the U.S. 1994 
Assault Weapons Ban, the authors state that, like the United States’ ban, the National 
Firearms Agreement targeted a certain type of gun that was only highly publicized 
because of its use in a few instances of mass murder.214 
 Writing barely seven years after the Port Arthur Massacre, Reuter and Mouzos are 
incredibly skeptical of the impacts the NAF had in alleviating gun violence, yet they do 
concede that firearm homicides and mass murders have declined along with the overall 
rate of crime. In scrutinizing these claims that Australia’s stringent gun laws did not 
affect rates of firearm violence, Philip Alpers has conducted a more prolonged and 
extensive study of the effects of Australia’s firearm regulations. He found: 
“In the 15 years preceding gun law reform, Australia saw 14 mass shootings in which a total 
of 117 people died. In the 20 years that followed, no mass public shootings occurred.215 In the 
same two decades after gun law reform, the rate of fatal shootings that claimed fewer than 
five victims—that is, the majority of gun deaths—also showed a downward trend.”216 
 
As reproduced below in Figure 3, Alpers shows that, while the rate of fatal shootings had 
been declining before the new firearm legislation in Australia, following the Port Arthur 
Massacre the risk of dying from firearm violence in Australia fell by more than half.217 
Looking twenty years later at the statistics for 2016, it’s evident that the rate of all gun 
deaths in Australia “shows no sign of increasing and… remains 25 times lower than that 
of the United States.”218 Furthermore, after the buyback, firearm suicide rates dropped 
almost 80% while non-firearm death rates remained the same.219 All in all, the states 
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where more firearms were bought back saw the largest declines in firearm deaths.220 It’s 
necessary for this thesis to harp on the declining statistics of firearm violence in 
Australia, for the events of Port Arthur and the subsequent buyback programs spurred 
progressive political action about regulating firearms in Australia. While the United 
States has not shown any real initiative to follow this same path, the lessons of 
Australia’s buyback programs still boast powerful results in diminishing gun violence. 
Figure 3: Rate of all gun deaths in Australia, 1987-2016221 
 
In closing, the events of Port Arthur effectively changed Australia’s attitude 
towards firearms forever. Faced with national disaster as a newly elected Prime Minister, 
John Howard was capable of capitalizing on his incumbent status and unifying all 
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political parties in a timely and powerful manner. Port Arthur was “the last straw.”222 It 
was clear that Australia’s firearm laws had to change, and when they did, Australians 
became safer. Now, Australia’s gun reforms stand as a model for other nations. Since the 
2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings, New Zealand has pursued a similar model of gun 
control as Australia and conducted a buyback program.223 For future research, it will be 
interesting to examine the success and potency of New Zealand’s buyback compared to 
that of Australia. 
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Chapter III: The Culture Question 
 
Introduction 
 Now that this thesis has adequately laid out the respective histories of firearm 
legislation and violence in the United States and Australia, Chapter III moves to consider 
the culture question. In this sense, it teases out similarities and differences in both the 
United States’ and Australia’s cultures regarding firearms. Chapter III starts with an in-
depth analysis of Australia’s structure of government and written constitution. To 
understand how Australia’s relationship with firearms was shaped from colonial times, 
this chapter draws attention to the Australian Constitution’s vast powers that are granted 
to the Queen of England as Australia’s Head of State. Comparing Australia’s relationship 
to Britain alongside that of the United States, Chapter III proceeds to examine Australia’s 
colonial history as a British penal society and its relationship to the British Empire. Here, 
this thesis highlights how Australia’s prolonged dependence on Great Britain did not 
create a culture dependent on self-defense. It concludes its look at Australian culture by 
describing the birth of Australian nationalism following WWII. Following this look into 
Australian culture, Chapter III then shifts to the United States’ culture. It acknowledges 
the differences in colonial history between the United States and Australia before 
scrutinizing the role of the NRA in shaping gun culture in America. In all, as both the 
U.S. and Australia were founded as British colonies, it is interesting how each nation’s 
culture varied with regard to firearms. While the American colonists had brought guns 
from Europe to defend themselves, the Australian colonists were prisoners that were not 
typically allowed to have weapons. This difference in colonization bled through the 
subsequent history of each nation and molded the culture that exists today. 
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A. Analysis of Australia’s Structure of Government 
 
In briefly touching upon the differences between the two countries’ government 
structures, the United States operates as both a representative democracy and a republic, 
where U.S. citizens vote for representatives that they believe will best embody their ideas 
and desires in government.224 Australia, on the other hand, is both a representative 
democracy and a constitutional monarchy with Queen Elizabeth II as Australia’s Head of 
State.225 Despite Queen Elizabeth II’s role as head of state in Australia, this title is merely 
formal and symbolic.226 In reality, the head of government, the Prime Minister, in 
Australia has the administrative power to govern the country.227 The Governor-General, 
who is selected by the Prime Minister, has the powers of the Queen delegated to him or 
her by the Australian Constitution and serves to advise the Prime Minister.228 Altogether, 
even though the Queen has a role in Australia’s government and has powers delegated to 
her through the Australian Constitution, she has never made use of her power to disallow 
an Australian Act of Parliament, and her status as Queen of Australia is unrelated to the 
United Kingdom Government.229 In light of this thesis, it is important to spell out the 
nature that the Queen of England has in relation to Australia’s system of government, for 
the United States grew out of a more hostile relationship with the UK during colonial 
times. With regard to the question of culture, the formal, written structure of the 
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Australian Constitution acts as a starting point to analyze some possible cultural 
differences between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand that led to such 
differing cultures towards firearms.  
Similar to the United States, Australia’s government is divided into three 
branches: a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. Yet, compared to the United States’ 
fairly brief Constitution which set up an autonomous, independent American nation, the 
text of the Australian Constitution of July 9, 1990, does not separate an independent 
Australia from the Queen of England’s rule. In fact, constitutionally, the Queen retains 
certain powers in both the Australian Parliament and the Executive Government. 
According to the first section of Chapter I of the Australian Constitution, which lays out 
the duties of Parliament, “The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in 
a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of 
Representatives.”230 On top of this, the next section further elaborates on the powers of 
the Queen in the Australian government by portraying: 
“A Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty’s representative in the 
Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen’s 
pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of the Queen as Her Majesty 
may be pleased to assign to him.”231  
 
For the Executive branch, the Australian Constitution lays out in Chapter II section 61 
that, “The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is 
exercisable by the Governor-General,” for the execution and maintenance of both the 
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth.232 Among other things, constitutionally, 
 
230 AUS Const. Ch. I, part I, §1. 
231 AUS Const. Ch. I, part I, §2. 
232 AUS Const. Ch. II, §61. 
 Leone 61 
the Governor-General is given the power to appoint Ministers of State233 and command 
the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth.234  
 While a textualist reading of the Australian Constitution would lead one to believe 
that the Queen of England held tremendous power over the Australian political system, 
reading the Australian Constitution literally is misleading. The Prime Minister and 
Cabinet possess the powers of the executive branch; their power is derived 
constitutionally from their membership in the Federal Executive Council, politically from 
the people electing the House of Representatives, and conventionally from the tradition 
of the Westminster system of government.235 In fleshing out the Australian system of 
government’s relationship to the central crux of this thesis, firearm culture, it’s necessary, 
as a starting point, to look to their written constitution in order to start teasing out the 
differences of culture and politics between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
that led to such divergent views on firearms. Particularly, Australia’s intimate 
relationship with and reliance on the United Kingdom from Australia’s founding as a 
penal society up through World War II had immense impacts on the development of 
Australian culture. Whereas the United States emerged from its revolutionary roots free 
from the shackles of British rule and passionate to violently defend their independence 
from the threat of tyranny,236 Australian nationalism is complicated and grew out of a 
dependence on the UK to provide protections and cultural hegemonic practices.237 
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B. History of Australia’s Colonization 
Unlike the United States of America, where colonists left Britain to escape 
religious persecution, Australia was the creation of a British imperial decision.238 
Following the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, a generation of urban poor were 
left to fend for themselves without work or money in the overcrowded cities of Britain.239 
These extreme conditions of poverty drove individuals to steal in order to survive.240 
Thus, as crime rates soared during this time period, the number of people incarcerated 
exceeded the capacity of British prisons, so thousands of criminals were diverted to 
British hulk ships for imprisonment in the harbors.241 Soon enough, the hulks were also 
filled to their maximum capacity, and Britain decided to ship these prisoners off to distant 
lands.242 While serious crimes, such as murder or rape, were punishable by death, petty 
crime offenders were forcibly moved to some unknown corner of the globe.243,244 At first, 
the British sent their prisoners to the United States, but when the American Revolution 
came to a close in 1782, Britain had to look to another land mass to alleviate the 
overcrowding of correctional facilities: Australia. 
Following Captain James Cook’s voyage to the east coast of New Holland in 
1770, the British decided that an eight-month boat trip to Australia would be the perfect 
location to seclude these criminals, even though Australia had been already been 
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inhabited for 65,000+ years by the Indigenous people.245 On January 26, 1788, at the 
arrival of the First Fleet, Admiral Arthur Phillip founded the penal colony of New South 
Wales.246 The colonization party consisted of a 1,500 mix of military personnel, civilians, 
and convicts, and immediately upon founding the colony of New South Wales the 
convicts were given work according to their skills that was necessary to colonize the 
Australian continent.247 Early on, the conditions in the penal society was grim; food was 
scarce and farmers had trouble making the most of the harsh Australian conditions.248 
Additionally, all newly-emancipated convicts in Australia suffered from the heavy social 
stigma for their prior petty crimes as British-oriented colonies emerged in Australia.249 
The transportation of British convicts to Australian colonies continued from 1788 up until 
1868; there were more than 160,000 convicts with 80% being male and 20% being 
female.250  
In sum, relating this history back to the nature of firearm legislation and culture, 
it’s important to provide this base of colonial history in order to better grasp the cultural 
differences between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. While the United 
States violently rebelled and gained their independence from Britain, Australia remained 
closely tied to Britain throughout the colonization of the Australian continent. As a 
society of excommunicated convicts, colonial Australians did not enjoy the same degree 
of freedoms and rights that colonial Americans did. Therefore, these colonial Australians 
were shackled to the rule of British law for their petty offences and forced to colonize the 
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Australian continent without any means to defend themselves. In the colonial United 
States, colonists brought guns to hunt and to defend themselves from any threat.251 
Colonial Americans viewed this right to own a gun as common law; while the right could 
be subject to restrictions, it could not be entirely withheld from the American people, and 
they enshrined the Second Amendment with this common law to protect Americans from 
the tyranny of federal government similar to that which they suffered under British 
rule.252 
 Early Australian convicts, on the other hand, did not recognize a common law 
nature of firearms in their society. Similar to the violence and bloodshed that ensued 
between Native Americans and the American colonists, Australian colonists fought a 
long and brutal series of frontier wars against the Aboriginal peoples. Nevertheless, 
Australian convicts were not entitled to bring guns with them to the Australian continent 
to defend themselves; instead, these convicts were chained together and subjected to 
heinous conditions and punishments while at sea.253 As a result, during the frontier wars, 
these Australian convict settlers lacked organization and weapons.254 Although the 
settlers of the Port Phillip District pleaded for organization and training in 1838, 
Australian civilians were never given proper military organization and training to fight on 
the frontier.255 Civilian gun ownership during this early period was not as common as it 
would later become, and colonial governors were increasingly hesitant to confer arms to 
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the general populous.256 All in all, British-Australian officials during this colonial time 
period did not entrust guns in the hands of the common man, for violence on the 
Australian frontier was controlled by the professionally trained British soldiers. In relying 
upon the British army for protection, Australia’s colonial history splits drastically from 
that of the United States. As the American colonists clung to their guns to oppose British 
tyranny, the Australian convicts were incapable of possessing the training or firepower to 
defend themselves alone. This dependence on British protection infused aspects of British 
culture into the Australian people, so “Australianness was embedded in their Britishness; 
the two were not in conflict.”257 
 
C. What is Australian (firearm) nationalism? 
 
As touched upon earlier in this chapter, the Australian Constitution was signed 
into effect on July 9, 1900, yet despite being its own sovereign entity, Australia chose to 
cling to and rely on Britain’s support and culture until the 1970s before pursuing a path of 
their own.258 Consequently, because of this jumbled nature of Australian dependence on 
Britain, it has been confusing for scholars to actually pinpoint a moment where Australia 
truly became its own nation with its individual sense of nationalism.259 Neville Meaney 
fashions a concise definition of Australian nationalism in claiming: 
“In employing nationalism as an analytical term, what has to be examined is the idea that 
Australians… had of themselves as ‘a people’… The nature of the democratic idea which gives 
national character to a people, especially in a democratic political culture like Australia’s, is revealed 
most authoritatively in the rhetoric of leaders of representative institutions, in the content of history 
and literature curricula, in oaths of loyalty and public rituals and in the popular enthusiasm for 
symbols, anthems and ceremonial days.”260  
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Australia was the “Reluctant Nation;” while fully capable of prospering as a fully 
independent nation, Australia was unwilling “to cut ties with Britain, affirm their own 
separate identity and embrace… ‘a possible independent destiny.’”261 The historical 
pervasiveness of British culture and ideals throughout Australia illustrates how 
Australians’ conception of themselves as British people conditioned them to integrate 
copious amounts of British culture into their daily life that had a direct effect on the 
growth of their Australian culture. 
 To provide examples illustrating Australians’ conception that they themselves 
were culturally British not Australian, first, the oaths of loyalty in public schools 
throughout the early 1900s were British.262 Also, the history curriculum both in schools 
and in universities taught Australian history “as a footnote to the grand story of the 
British peoples’ great Empire which covered a sixth of the globe.”263,264 Moreover, 
Britain’s Empire Day, which Australia introduced a decade before Britain did, was 
celebrated as a sacred occasion, whereas Australia Day retained no national spirit and 
was only celebrated as a secular picnic.265 Therefore, in defining nationalism, Neville 
Meaney clarifies, “If ideas of nationalism are not expressions of the essence of a people’s 
being but historically conditioned imaginings… in the nationalist era Britishness was the 
dominant cultural myth in Australia, the dominant social idea giving meaning to ‘the 
people.’”266 From its colonization, Australia retained exceptionally close ties with the 
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British Empire that began with the First Fleet in 1788 and continued throughout the 
1950s. This overtly submissive and cordial relationship with the British led Australians to 
extensively rely on the British for trade and military protection as Australians were 
unwilling to decipher their own form of Australian nationalism. 
 It was not until the Fall of Singapore in February 1942 when Australia finally 
began to diminish its reliance on protection from Britain.267 In this sense, the threat and 
fear of communism spreading from Japan into Australia in World War II and the inability 
of the British to counter this threat serve as the catalysts which increased Australian 
reliance on a new global superpower: the United States.268 The resulting ANZUS 
Alliance of 1951 strengthened Australian borders and security, for “Australia's active 
support of US deterrence affords us [Australians] protection under Washington's 
extended nuclear umbrella, and provides us access to cutting-edge technology, advanced 
defense capabilities and exquisite intelligence products that we wouldn't otherwise 
get.”269 This access to the US’ military technology and protection is expressed through 
the presence of “joint facilities” on the Australian continent, most notably the Joint 
Defense Facility Pine Gap in Central Australia, the Harold E. Holt Naval Communication 
Station at North West Cape in Western Australia, and the Australian Defense Satellite 
Communications Station at Kojarena. As Richard Tanter describes, these joint facilities 
operate and are critical for: 
 
267 At the Fall of Singapore, Japanese forces managed to use their speed to overwhelm British, Australian, 
and Indian forces killing more than 138,000 soldiers of which roughly 130,000 died while prisoners of war. 
“The Fall of Singapore,” Commonwealth War Graves Commission, https://www.cwgc.org/history-and-
archives/second-world-war/campaigns/war-in-the-east/singapore. 
268 Alan Patience, “To Be or Not to Be in Asia?” in Australian Foreign Policy in Asia: Middle Power or 
Awkward Partner? (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017) 98. 
269 Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone, “There's a Part of the US-Australia Alliance We 
Rarely Talk about — Nuclear Weapons,” ABC News, February 27, 2019, www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-
27/us-australia-nuclear-alliance-in-the-indo-pacific/10849350. 
 Leone 68 
 “…US nuclear-war targeting, US-Japanese missile defense, US drone and special forces extra-
judicial counter-terrorism killings, the rapidly growing US capacity for space warfare, and direct 
support for ground and air operations in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and for US combat 
operations in any outbreak of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.”270  
 
Yet, security and military benefits of the ANZUS Alliance aside, Australia’s 
interrelationship with British culture was not ousted for American ideals during this 
change in focus of Australian security. In fact, following the ‘Great Betrayal’ at 
Singapore, 65 per cent of Australians polled in a public opinion survey opted to be British 
when asked whether they wished to have British or Australian nationality.271 Hence, an 
individual’s sense of Australian Britishness was not the result of imperial cultural 
hegemony and colonial dependence on British protection.272 Instead, during the 
colonization of Australia, the first Australian settlers had a “fragile hold on a vast land set 
in an Asian sea,” so the colonists were increasingly “receptive to the atavistic idea of 
[British] community.”273 Relying on Britain for support, the Australian colonies were 
proud members of the British Empire making it easier for them to come to terms with 
their “racial and cultural heritage as the basis for their idea of nationalism.”274 As 
conceptions of Australianness advanced, these British qualities became intertwined with 
uniquely Australian characteristics of mateship and suspicion of authority.275,276  
Following World War II, Australia’s dream of the unity of the British peoples came to an 
end: 
“It was events outside Australia's control, the transformation of the British Commonwealth and 
Britain's decision to find its future in Europe, which forced Australians finally to see that their British 
 
270 Richard Tanter, “Tightly Bound: The United States and Australia’s Alliance-Dependent Militarization,” 
The Asia Pacific Journal 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2018), https://apjjf.org/2018/11/Tanter.html. 
271 Meaney, “Britishness and Australian identity,” 80. 
272 Id., 84. 
273 Id., 81. 
274 Id., 82. 
275 Id., 83. 
276 For a more detailed narrative about these Australian values, See Russel Ward’s The Australian Legend. 
 Leone 69 
dream was an illusion, to acknowledge that Britain was a 'foreign country' and to try to find their own 
place in the world.”277 
 
Connecting this lengthy narrative of Australia’s British sense of nationalism back to this 
thesis’ overarching focus on firearm culture, Britain’s role in influencing and shaping 
Australia’s idea of nationalism can be tied into Australian’s conception of firearms. In 
receiving beneficial protective services from the British Empire during the colonial 
period, Australians were historically more disengaged from the self-defense nature of 
firearms and a right to bear arms than the American colonists were. The Australian 
colonists had no desire of rebelling against the British Empire.278 Their only perceived 
threat was the Aboriginal population, but the Aborigines did not possess or use firearms 
on the frontier preferring to use traditional weaponry like spears.279 With the help of 
British firepower, violence against the Aboriginals was incredibly one-sided resulting in 
66,680 Aboriginal casualties between the 1820s and early 1900s.280 Rather than 
celebrating and memorializing this history of self-defense like Americans have done for 
the American Revolution, Australians ignored their widespread massacre of Aboriginals 
in the frontier wars in what has been termed by anthropologist WEH Stanner as the “great 
Australian silence.”281 Hence, the Australian colonial history lacked the need to take up 
arms to defend oneself from the tyranny of the British government. Australian 
nationalism blossomed from its British roots; in expanding these ideals, Australians 
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continue to bring forth new civic ideas that enhance Australian nationalism and 
acknowledge the growing diversity of peoples. 
Now, every January 26, Australians annually celebrate their growing sense of 
nationalism on Australia Day. While it began as a celebration of the emancipated, 
English convicts’ settlement of the Australian continent, Australia Day has recently 
evolved into a “celebration of Australia that reflects the nation’s diverse people.”282 This 
shift in Australian identity has come as Australia continues to work out its place both 
regionally and globally. Australia “knows it cannot be another US… It knows that the 
ties with Britain will only get weaker over time;”283 therefore, in figuring out where they 
belong, Australians have altered their British-centric focus of Australian culture to 
celebrate a more-encompassing view of what it means to be an Australian. In effect, this 
has meant moving Australia Day’s purpose away from the imperial creation of a British 
Australia and towards a celebration of the growing Australian culture.284 Most 
importantly, this change now includes the recognition and commemoration of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ culture, which has existed in Australia for 
more than 65,000 years but was subject to unrelenting violence and oppression from the 
British settlers.285,286 All and all, Australia’s culture, as a result of its immediate ties with 
British tradition and culture, has historically struggled to find and celebrate its own sense 
of nationalism. Nevertheless, in reassessing the role of Britishness in Australian history, 
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Australia has begun to adapt to a period of social change and bring new ideas like multi-
racialism and multiculturalism into everyday Australian life.287  
 
D. America’s Colonial Legacy of Firearm Culture 
 
 The histories of both the United States and Australia were each fraught with 
large-scale violence against the native populations. In the United States, this bloodshed 
stemmed from the initial colonization of the continental U.S., where the earliest 
American colonists brought guns to hunt for food and defend themselves from the Native 
Americans when they had to.288 While the assumption was that the English settlers could 
get along peacefully with the natives, the colonists’ hopes were quickly proven incorrect, 
and they had to rely on guns for self-defense.289 For example, in December 1620 when 
the Mayflower arrived in present-day Provincetown, the initial settlers were met with 
violent retaliation from Native Americans; after the Englishmen found and dug up buried 
baskets of corn with no fear of repercussion for taking it, Native Americans attacked a 
group of the intruders a few days later with bows and arrows at “First Encounter 
Beach.”290 Because of their firearms, the English settlers were able to retaliate and scare 
off the attackers.291 On top of this, the glorified first Thanksgiving in Plymouth of 1621 
was not as friendly and naïve as it has been taught in American schools. While the initial 
hostilities did subside with a peace treaty between the Wampanoag, English colonists, 
and the Massasoit, the English settlers were still armed at the feast for hunting and, if 
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need be, self-defense.292 As a result of the violent tensions between Native Americans 
and English settlers, the early history of the United States conditioned these men that 
“having firearms was a matter of right – a right recognized in common law,” yet this 
common law right was still subject to restrictions from the earliest colonial times.293,294  
Thus, this culture of defending oneself with firearms against some existential 
threat was ingrained in the American mindset from the outset. Following the French and 
Indian War, Great Britain’s imposition of taxes and customs duties on the colonies to 
support the cost of a standing army led to the colonist’s apathy towards Britain.295 With 
Parliament’s levying of the Quartering Act and the Stamp Act, the colonists, who “still 
had the right and the duty to bear those firearms they had,” decided to defend themselves 
from the increased oppression they were being subjected to by those in power far away in 
Great Britain.296 Without going into excruciating detail about the Revolutionary War, its 
impact and implications on the culture of firearms in the United States is astounding and 
is where this thesis finds a critical breaking point between the histories of the United 
States and Australia. Early Americans relied substantially on their weapons for self-
defense against first the Native Americans and then the British Empire. Albeit the 
colonial militia retained little discipline and training in tactics and structure of a well-
regulated militia during the Revolutionary War, the Americans were still successful in 
securing their freedom with the use of firearms, which created a legacy that shaped the 
country the United States would become.297  
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E. The Unstoppable NRA 
 
It would be impossible for this thesis to mention gun culture in the United States 
without expanding on the massive impact that the National Rifle Association has had in 
influencing Americans. Following the Civil War, two Union veterans, William Conant 
Church and George Wood Wingate, formed the NRA because they believed, “An 
association should be organized… to promote and encourage rifle shooting on a scientific 
basis.”298 On November 17, 1871, the National Rifle Association was granted a charter in 
New York “to promote rifle practice… and to promote the introduction of a system of 
aimed drill and target firing among… the militia of other states.”299 Presently, the NRA 
stands as an $88 million-dollar-a-year corporate non-profit with about 2.6 million 
members, 400 employees and assets of $128 million.300 Shifting its focus from promoting 
recreational marksmanship, hunting, and safety training to stopping any attempts at gun 
control, the NRA hardened its absolutist views in 1977 when Harlon Bronson Carter 
seized leadership of the NRA in the Cincinnati Revolt.301 Since then, the NRA now 
represents the largest impediment to possible attempts at gun control in the U.S.302 In 
fueling its agenda with fear and intimidation, the NRA is unyielding in its stance against 
gun controls.303 Since its founding, the NRA has clung to the ideal of the American 
rifleman tradition rooted in the Revolutionary War.304 This image of the “citizen-soldier” 
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symbolizes the NRA’s ideals and appeals to a wide range of the American populace as 
the NRA prides itself on defending these gun owners’ rights and freedoms.305 
How then has the NRA successfully managed to draw this potent firearm culture 
out of American citizens? Put simply, fear and intimidation are the NRA’s most effective 
tools:  
“In newspapers and magazine ads, Americans are warned of the need for an armed civilian 
population as a check against the tyranny of a strong federal government. Other ads paint a 
world in which unarmed victims are easy prey for criminals and the police are never there 
when you need them. The only reliable form of self-defense, readers are assured, comes from 
the barrel of a gun.”306 
 
Further, the NRA proceeds to also translate this ideology into political action on Capitol 
Hill. As Josh Sugarmann conveys, “Its political approach is not sophisticated: reward 
your friends and punish your enemies.”307 While this strategy only fuels political 
partisanship, it works for the NRA. By utilizing its lobbying arm, the Institute for 
Legislative Action (ILA), the NRA delegates a substantial portion of its budget to the 
ILA in order to battle federal and state gun control measures and motivate the 
membership.308 This anti-gun-control message permeates through all of the NRA’s 
programs, including publications, fundraising, public affairs, and member services.309 
The degree to which the NRA makes its message heard on issues of gun control happens 
on a mass scale. Whenever any measure of gun control is proposed in local, state, or 
federal laws, NRA mailings are sent to all of its members showcasing said gun control 
measure as “a personal attack threatening the very life of each NRA member and his 
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family.”310 Since its origins as a firearms training and sportsmanship association, the 
NRA has radicalized its ideology. In doing so, the NRA has capitalized on its members’ 
fears of disarmament and violence and created a formidable base of Second Amendment 
fundamentalist voters that view gun control as the only issue by which to judge a 
candidate for office.311 
 The NRA has taken the United States’ colonial understanding of the right to bear 
arms and made it into a “literal war” that will not end until the last inkling of proposed 
gun control is defeated.312 Because the NRA reshaped firearm culture and infused it with 
fear and intimidation, the National Rifle Association is constantly successful in battling 
gun control. As a result, the “political ineptitude of gun control organizations, the apathy 
of their supporters, politicians’ fear of NRA retaliation and many Americans’ misplaced 
faith in firearms as effective self-defense tools” have given the NRA inordinate power to 
frame the parameters of the gun debate however they desire.313 In the end, the NRA’s 
capacity to frame gun debates means “that firearms… are rarely seen for what they are: 
inherently dangerous consumer products.”314 For rates of firearm violence in the U.S. and 
notions of gun culture, this attitude is toxic; the NRA’s emphasis on fear and intimidation 
ignores the recurring problem of mass shootings and fails to deal with polarization by 
instead attacking the opposition and refusing to respectfully dialogue.315 To reach some 
sense of common ground, the United States’ political leaders must stop listening to 
lobbyists who pander to fears.316 Whether these fears spawn from Second Amendment 
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fundamentalists or hardliner gun control advocates does not matter, what matters for the 
preservation of both life and liberty of Americans is achieving realistic solutions to the 
issues of gun violence at hand.  
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Chapter IV: Where does one go from here? 
 
 In tracing the histories of firearm legislation, violence, and culture in Australia 
and the United States, this thesis has rooted out some explanations for differences 
between the American and Australian gun cultures. At the crux of this difference is the 
Second Amendment. During an interview with Craig Whitney,317 Whitney commented on 
the reason why Australia could enact such sweeping gun reform, and he stated, “I 
oversimplified it, but they [Australians] do not have a Second Amendment or the history 
that led up to it. We do.”318 On the whole, it is this variance between U.S. and Australian 
history that spurred the subsequent growth of two very distinct gun cultures. While many 
younger Americans living in big cities or affluent suburbs are reliant on the law and 
police powers to keep them safe, these individuals are far removed from the colonists 
who had to depend on firearms to protect against attack.319 Meanwhile, American gun 
owners, especially in rural areas, continue to view themselves as “take-care-of-yourself 
people.”320 They follow the tradition of American colonists who escaped persecution in 
Britain and brought firearms to the U.S. to hunt and to defend themselves in order to 
survive on the frontier.321 Hence, the ability to own and use firearms was a common law 
right in American colonial society.322 After the American Revolution, this common law 
right was codified in the Second Amendment “to protect Americans from tyranny that 
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could be imposed by a strong federal government.”323 Although the nature of firearms has 
significantly evolved from colonial times, the message for most American gun owners 
remains the same: “…the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be 
infringed.”324 
 Despite also being colonized by Great Britain, colonial Australians did not form 
this connection with firearms from the outset. Instead, the involuntary migration of 
British convicts on “dangerously overcrowded and filthy decommissioned hulks”325 
meant that, unlike early American settlers, colonial Australian convicts did not travel to 
the Australian continent with the right to bear arms; in fact, these Australian convicts did 
not enjoy many rights at all because they were processed at a colonial penal institution 
and given labor assignments upon arrival.326 Whilst early Americans had to protect 
themselves from both Native Americans and other European powers in the continental 
U.S.,327 Australia was only colonized by the British, and its sole threat to security was 
from the Aboriginal groups armed with spears.328 Learning from its failure in the 
Revolutionary War, Great Britain made obsolete the necessity of civilians owning a 
firearm to protect oneself from violence in Australia by having line regiments serve in 
Australia as a part of a cycle.329 The British Empire’s constant protection of Australia 
meant that civilian gun ownership on the early frontier was uncommon.330 Additionally, 
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requests from civilians to “organize into militia units to fight on the frontier,” as was the 
case with the Port Phillip District settlers in 1838, were ignored and unnecessary for 
Australian security.331 Australia’s roots as a penal society and its reliance on the British 
Empire up through World War II conditioned Australians to explicitly interpret and 
present their convict history as the “national history.”332 This common understanding of 
Australia’s culture has bled through the Australian Constitution. Having not rebelled 
against Britain like the United States, Australians did not need to resort to violence to 
secure their freedom and accepted “their [Britain’s] racial and cultural heritage as the 
basis for their idea of nationalism.”333 
 With these stark differences between the foundations of U.S. and Australian 
cultures having been laid out, this thesis on the politics and culture of firearm regulation 
and violence in the U.S. and Australia concludes by raising possible solutions to the 
United States’ problem of gun violence. In light of Australia’s successful buyback 
programs and firearm regulations, would the United States be able to draw inspiration 
from the Australian model and implement something similar? Philip Alpers expressed, 
“Australia followed standard public health procedures to reduce the risk of multiple 
shooting events, and we can see the evidence. It worked.”334 Even Barack Obama during 
his second term of presidency in 2016 acknowledged the success of Australia’s endeavors 
in claiming, “When Australia had a mass killing… it was just so shocking the entire 
country said, ‘Well, we’re going to completely change our gun laws,’ and they did. And 
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it hasn’t happened since.”335 Despite the significant reduction in gun ownership and mass 
shootings in Australia, gun violence has not completely disappeared from the Australian 
continent.336 However, compared to the United States, Australia’s rate of all gun deaths 
per 100,000 people is 0.88 to the United States’ equivalent of 12.21.337  
The Australian system of firearm regulations worked. If the United States was to 
follow suit and simply copy Australia’s initiatives, the results would not only be nowhere 
as effective but also would probably not work.338 Alpers describes why a massive 
reduction in the national stockpile of weapons, like that of Australia, could not be enacted 
in the U.S., and he claims, “Because no two jurisdictions share the same problems or 
legislative or social settings – let alone attitudes – none can claim to have discovered the 
magic bullet.”339 For Australia, the lack of a Second Amendment equivalent made it easy 
for John Howard to push forward with the National Firearms Agreement without 
infringing on the rights of Australian citizens.340 Also, as a freshly-elected Prime Minister 
with a massive majority in Parliament, John Howard had relatively little opposition to his 
policies,341 whereas the current division between a Democratic House of Representatives 
and a Republican Senate in the U.S. stalls bipartisan action. Lastly, Howard’s speed of 
government action following Port Arthur was swift and promising; in just 12 days, 
Howard had corralled all six states and two territories to agree to and pass uniform gun 
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control legislation.342 For the U.S., Katie Beck rightfully expresses, “It is hard to fathom 
the U.S. government ever being able to get all 50 states to agree to something, let alone 
act that quickly.”343 In total, whereas a national buyback of certain firearms helped fix 
Australia’s issue of gun violence, the Australian model cannot be used as a band-aid 
solution to the U.S.’s prolonged problem of mass shootings. Instead, the United States 
should recognize the success and merit of Australia’s actions while determining the best 
course of action towards gun control in the U.S. 
 The other extreme would be to largely continue how the United States Congress 
has been pursuing gun control regulations: by doing relatively nothing. With the NRA 
providing “big-dollar campaign spending and purported legions of voters in orange caps” 
to politicians that ally with the ideals of the NRA, the political power of the NRA is 
capable of injecting the volatile issue of gun control into a campaign making gun control 
“quickly dominate the campaign and derail any politician’s packed message.”344 By 
preventing any substantive action towards firearm regulations, the NRA’s efforts allow 
for the never-ending expansion of the domestic firearms market.345 Along with the NRA, 
the recent Supreme Court decisions in D.C. v Heller (2008) and McDonald v Chicago 
(2010) have forced some efforts at gun regulation to take a few steps back. While these 
decisions do uphold the sanctity of the Second Amendment, they are a colossal 
impediment to a state’s ability to decide how to effectively regulate firearms. On top of 
this, enshrining the Second Amendment with this much protection allows the NRA and 
gun owners to attack any measure of gun control as a “fight against you, your guns, and 
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your freedom.”346 Ignoring the issues at hand or enacting flimsy legislation to counteract 
the problem of gun violence does not fully resolve the crisis; U.S. politicians have to both 
respect gun owners’ Second Amendment rights while reaffirming that this right can and 
will be regulated to protect the life and liberty of all citizens. 
 Rather than demanding either full restrictions on guns or no regulations at all, this 
thesis shows that a middle ground must be taken on the issue to bring together members 
of both the NRA and the gun control coalition in a constructive and respectful 
conversation. For what measures should inevitably be taken, this thesis mirrors many of 
the proposals laid out by Craig Whitney. First, the database of the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS) must be augmented to include people who 
are drug abusers, mentally ill, or otherwise disqualified to purchase a gun under federal 
law.347 Whitney discussed that at the federal level background checks need to be 
universal and cover private and registered sales; likewise, at the state level, “red flag 
laws” need to be put in place to prevent the sale or possession of guns to mentally ill 
individuals.348,349  
Conducting a four-year study from 2007 through 2010 on the effect that more firearm 
laws have in reducing the number of firearm fatalities, Eric Fleegler et al. found that “a 
higher number of firearm laws in a state are associated with a lower rate of firearm 
fatalities in the state, overall and for suicides and homicides individually.”350 By dividing 
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firearm legislation into five categories of (1) curbing firearm trafficking, (2) 
strengthening background checks on purchasers of firearms beyond those required by the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, (3) ensuring child safety, (4) banning military 
style assault weapons, and (5) restricting guns in public places, Fleegler et al.’s results 
found that between 2007 and 2010, there were 121,084 firearm fatalities of which 73,702 
were firearm suicides and 47,382 were firearm homicides.351 Here, the magnitude of 
firearm suicides is startling as it an issue that constantly is overshadowed by the 
prominence of mass shootings in the media to provoke public opinion. The threat that 
firearms pose not only to the victims of mass shootings but also to the firearm owners 
themselves that may be suffering from mental health issues and resort to committing 
suicide with the quick pull of a trigger. While this thesis has largely looked towards 
culture and policy, it would be interesting for a future study to look at the correlation 
between mental health and firearm use/abuse. 
This leads to the next necessary measure: increasing the penalties for committing 
a crime with guns.352 Making the repercussions more intense for gun violence will scare 
offenders and is a regulation that the NRA has also had no problem in endorsing.353  
Next, a federal firearms trafficking statute needs to be implemented to crack down 
on straw purchasers and firearm dealers that knowingly sell to disqualified buyers.354 
While it is incredibly tough and most likely impossible for the U.S. to reach uniform 
national gun regulation like Australia did, the transfer of firearms across state lines has to 
be tightly regulated to prevent firearms that are illegal in one state from being smuggled 
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in from a state where said guns are totally legal. A further regulation that will help to 
prevent the illegal transfer and use of arms is the “fingerprinting” of bullets and shell 
casings in order to trace guns used in crimes.355 With each bullet and shell labelled with 
the serial number of the gun, not only will lawful gun owners not have to worry about 
being accused for a gun crime they did not commit, but the gun in question will also be 
more easily identified. Lastly, the final measure of gun control this thesis will put forward 
is the encouragement of all 50 states “to pass legislation requiring state or local licenses 
to own a gun, mandate training in the use and storage of firearms, and institute state 
registration.”356 Just like drivers need to take a test to demonstrate competency in order to 
acquire a driver’s license, gun owners should have to exhibit competency of both firearm 
use and safety on a firing range.357 All in all, these are just some of the possible routes to 
be taken towards a safer gun culture in the U.S. While the implementation of just a few of 
these measures would serve to better gun safety in the U.S., this thesis holds that policies 
should be created to enact all of these measures in unison. Without proper safeguards 
against holes in the system of firearm sales, regulations, and use, the issue of gun 
violence will only be perpetuated in the U.S. After suffering 117 mass shootings since 
1982, it is about time the United States steps up and wholesomely addresses the issue at 
hand. 
 At the end of the day, to bring forth effective, visible changes to the United 
States’ issue of gun violence, the American people need to break through the 
hyperinflation of political polarization and talk rationally with individuals of all political 
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backgrounds to alleviate partisanship. This is not easy. Craig Whitney described this 
conflict as a “dark moment in our political history.”358 The American political culture is 
being infused with directing all one’s emotion, hate, and intolerance towards any view 
that does not align with one’s own opinion; this inability to converse as equals simply 
stalls the creation of beneficial policies and allows the underlying issues to fester. With 
regard to firearms, although there will always be sides in the debate engaging in 
“vigorous political struggle,” Professor Sanford Levinson emphasizes the importance of 
making the political sides appear “more human” to one another: 
“Perhaps "we" might be led to stop referring casually to "gun nuts" just as, maybe, members 
of the NRA could be brought to understand the real fear that the currently almost uncontrolled 
system of gun ownership sparks in the minds of many whom they casually dismiss as 
"bleeding-heart liberals." Is not, after all, the possibility of serious, engaged discussion about 
political issues at the heart of what is most attractive in both liberal and republican versions of 
politics?”359 
 
In order to achieve this form of respectful, critical discussion about proper firearm 
regulations, constructive participation from the NRA is necessary.360 Rather than using 
scare tactics to label any measure of gun control as a “total confiscation of our [NRA 
members] firearms and the end of the Second Amendment,”361 the NRA must revert back 
to its founding values of educating and training marksmanship skills.362 Overall, the 
success of gun control regulations in the U.S. is contingent upon a “positive recognition 
by all Americans… that the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right.”363 While 
the right is not absolute and comes with certain responsibilities, this does not mean law-
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abiding individuals should be treated as if they were criminals just because they own a 
gun.364 Every American, gun owners and non-gun owners alike, has to come together and 
recognize one’s civic duty to do whatever it takes to make the free use of firearms safer 
than what it is presently. For Australia, the remedy was straightforward as they had no 
culturally or constitutionally ingrained sense of a right to bear arms. The United States, 
on the other hand, must balance its constitutional and cultural rights to rectify the extent 
of firearm violence in the U.S. without completely impeding on the gun rights of its 
citizens like Australia has done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
364 Id. 
 Leone 87 
Bibliography 
 
Albert, Craig J. “Assault Weapons Ban Just Won’t Work.” The New York Times, September 16, 1994. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/16/opinion/l-assault-weapons-ban-just-won-t-work-
260967.html?module=inline. 
Alpers, Philip, Amélie Rossetti and Daniel Salinas. “United States – Gun Facts, Figures and the Law.” 
Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney, GunPolicy.org, 2019. 
https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/united-states. 
Alpers, Philip and Zareh Ghazarian. "The ‘perfect storm’ of gun control: From policy inertia to world 
leader." In Successful Public Policy: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand, edited by Luetjens 
Joannah, Mintrom Michael, and Hart Paul’t, 207-233. Acton ACT, Australia: ANU Press, 2019. 
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh4zj6k.16. 
Alpers, Philip. “The Big Melt: How One Democracy Changed After Scrapping a Third of its Firearms.” In 
Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis, edited by 
Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013. 
Australian Government. “How Government Works.” Australia.gov.au. https://www.australia.gov.au/about-
government/how-government-works. 
Bailey, Brendan. “Bills Digest No. 155 2002-03: National Handgun Buyback Bill 2003.” Parliament of 
Australia, May 22, 2003. 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0203/03bd155. 
Beck, Katie. “Are Australia’s gun laws the solution for the US?” BBC News, October 4, 2017. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-35048251. 
Berkowitz, Bonnie, Chris Alcantara and Denise Lu. “The terrible numbers that grow with each mass 
shooting.” The Washington Post, Updated December 12, 2019. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/mass-shootings-in-america/. 
Blocher, Joseph and Darrell A.H. Miller. The Positive Second Amendment: Rights, Regulation, and the 
Future of Heller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. “National Firearms Act.” ATF, 1934. 
Chapman, Simon. Over Our Dead Bodies: Port Arthur and Australia’s fight for gun control. Reprint, 
Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013. 
Chappell, Duncan, Peter Grabosky, Paul Wilson, and Satyanshu Mukherjee. “Firearms and violence in 
Australia.” Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 10 (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 1988): 1-5. 
Conlin Casella, Eleanor. “Prisoner of His Majesty: Postcoloniality and the Archaeology of British Penal 
Transportation.” World Archaeology 37, no. 3 (Historical Archaeology, September 2005): 453-
467. 
Connor, John. The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 
2002. 
Daley, Paul. “Our Most Important War: The legacy of frontier conflict.” In The Honest History Book, 
edited by David Stephens and Alison Broinowski. Sydney: NewSouth. 
Donnelly, Larry. “America’s gun culture: What makes Americans so attached to their weapons?” 
TheJournal.ie, March 4, 2018. https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/americas-gun-culture-3877087-
Mar2018/. 
Donohue, John and Theodora Boulouta. “That Assault Weapon Ban? It Really Did Work.” The New York 
Times, September 4, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/opinion/assault-weapon-
ban.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share. 
Douglas, Roger. “Gun Laws and Sudden Death: Do They Make Much Difference?” The Australian 
Quarterly 69, no. 1 (1997): 50-62. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20634765. 
Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton. “U.S. Gun Rights Truly Are American 
Exceptionalism.” Bloomberg Opinion, March 7, 2013. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2013-03-07. 
“Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Australia.” Library of Congress, July 30, 2015. 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/australia.php. 
 Leone 88 
Fleegler, Eric W., Lois K. Lee, Michael C. Monuteaux, David Hemmingway, and Rebekah Mannix. 
“Firearm Legislation and Firearm-Related Fatalities in the United States.” JAMA Intern Med. 173, 
no. 9 (March 6, 2013): 732-740. 
Follman, Mark, Gavin Aronsen and Deanna Pan. “US Mass Shootings, 1982-2019: Data From Mother 
Jones’ Investigation.” Mother Jones Updated: February 26, 2020. 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data/. 
Gaffney, Dan. “Gun laws stopped mass shootings in Australia.” The University of Sydney, March 13, 2018. 
https://sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2018/03/13/gun-laws-stopped-mass-shootings-in-
australia.html#. 
Giffords Law Center. “Background Check Procedures.” Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 
2019. https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-checks. 
Grimson, Matthew. “Port Arthur Massacre: The Shooting Spree That Changed Australia’s Gun Laws.” 
NBC News, July 25, 2015. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/port-arthur-massacre-shooting-
spree-changed-australia-gun-laws-n396476. 
Howard, Bob. “Political Review: March 1996-September 1996.” The Australian Quarterly 68, no. 4 
(1996): 117-130. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20634756. 
Hughes, Robert. The Fatal Shore: The epic of Australia’s founding. New York: Vintage Books, 1988. 
Johnson, David Kyle. “Guns Don’t Kill People, People Do? What exactly is wrong with the argument.” 
Psychology Today, February 12, 2013. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog. 
Karberg, Jennifer C. and Ronald J. Frandsen et al. “Background Checks for Firearm Transfers, 2015 – 
Statistical Tables.” Bureau of Justice Statistics, November 2017. 
LaPierre, Wayne. “NRA’s Wayne LaPierre Stands Strong for Law-Abiding Citizens.” National Rifle 
Association, 2019, https://home.nra.org/nras-wayne-lapierre-stands-strong-for-law-abiding-
citizens/. 
“Legislative Reforms.” Australian Institute of Criminology, November 3, 2017. 
https://aic.gov.au/publications/rpp/rpp116/legislative-reforms. 
Levinson, Sanford. “The Embarrassing Second Amendment.” The Yale Law Journal 99, no. 637 (1989): 
637-659. 
Masters, Johnathan. “U.S. Gun Policy: Global Comparisons.” Council on Foreign Relations, Updated 
August 6, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-gun-policy-global-comparisons. 
McClenathan, Jane, Molly Pahn and Michael Siegel. “The Changing Landscape of U.S. Gun Policy: State 
Firearm Laws, 1991-2016.” Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2016. 
Meaney, Neville. “Britishness and Australian identity: The problem of nationalism in Australian history 
and historiography.” Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (2001): 76-90. 
Melleuish, Gregory. “No longer tied to Britain, Australia is still searching for its place in the world.” The 
Conversation, January 26, 2017. https://theconversation.com/no-longer-tied-to-britain-australia-is-
still-searching-for-its-place-in-the-world-70407. 
Miller, Matthew, Lisa Hepburn and Deborah Azrael. “Firearm Acquisition Without Background 
Checks.” Annals of Internal Medicine 166, no. 4 (2017): 233–241. 
Morton, David. "Gunning for the World." Foreign Policy, no. 152 (2006): 58-67. 
www.jstor.org/stable/25461992. 
National Australia Day Council. “About Australia Day.” Australia Day. 
https://www.australiaday.org.au/about-australia-day/. 
“New Zealand Introduces New Gun Control Bills Six Months After Christchurch Massacre.” Public Radio 
International (PRI), September 13, 2019. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2289946704?accountid=11456. 
Norberry, Jennifer, Derek Woolner, and Kirsty Magarey. “After Port Arthur – Issues of Gun Control in 
Australia.” Parliament of Australia, May 7, 1996. 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Pu
blications_Archive/CIB/cib9596/96cib16#National%20uniform%20gun%20laws. 
Parliament of Australia. “Infosheet 20 – The Australian system of government.” 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_proc
edure/00_-_Infosheets/Infosheet_20_-_The_Australian_system_of_government. 
Patience, Alan. “To Be or Not to Be in Asia?” In Australian Foreign Policy in Asia: Middle Power or 
Awkward Partner? London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017. 
 Leone 89 
Patrick, A. Odysseus. “Australia’s Gun Laws Are Not a Model for America.” The New York Times, 
February 22, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/opinion/australias-gun-laws-
america.html. 
Pew Research Center. “Gun Policy Remains Divisive, But Several Proposals Still Draw Bipartisan 
Support” October 18, 2018. https://www.people-press.org/2018/10/18/gun-policy-remains-
divisive-but-several-proposals-still-draw-bipartisan-support/. 
Rawle, William. A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (Philadelphia 1829). In “The 
Founders’ Constitution: Vol. 5, Amend. II, Doc. 9.” http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs9.html. 
Reuter, Peter and Jenny Mouzos. “Australia: A Massive Buy Back of Low-Risk Guns.” In Evaluating Gun 
Policy: Effects on Crime and Violence, edited by Jens Ludwig, and Philip J. Cook, 121-156. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 
Rosewood, Jack. Martin Bryant: The Port Arthur Massacre. New York: Wiq Media, 2015. 
Sitzmann, Joseph E. "High-Value, Low-Value, and No-Value Guns: Applying Free Speech Law to the 
Second Amendment." The University of Chicago Law Review 86, no. 7 (November 2019): 1981-
2030. www.jstor.org/stable/26792622. 
Smith, Tom, “Why Great Britain Sent its Prisoners to Australia.” Culture Trip, August 13, 2018. 
https://theculturetrip.com/pacific/australia/articles/why-great-britain-sent-its-prisoners-to-
australia/. 
Stockler, Asher. “Clinton-Era Assault Weapons Ban Did Work, According to New Research.” Newsweek, 
September 28, 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/assault-weapons-ban-1994-gun-rights-1461951. 
Sugarmann, Josh. National Rifle Association: Money-Firepower-Fear. District of Columbia: Violence 
Policy Center, 1992. 
Tanter, Richard. “Tightly Bound: The United States and Australia’s Alliance-Dependent Militarization.” 
The Asia Pacific Journal 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2018). https://apjjf.org/2018/11/Tanter.html. 
“The Fall of Singapore.” Commonwealth War Graves Commission. https://www.cwgc.org/history-and-
archives/second-world-war/campaigns/war-in-the-east/singapore. 
“‘There Will Be Changes’ to Gun Laws, New Zealand Prime Minister Says.” The New York Times, March 
17, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/world/asia/new-zealand-shooting.html. 
Toor, Pooja. “United States vs. Everybody, a comparative analysis of gun laws in America and various 
countries around the world.” Journal of Law and International Affairs at Penn State Law, April 3, 
2018. https://sites.psu.edu/jlia/author/pxt41/#_edn4. 
Townshend, Ashley and Brendan Thomas-Noone. “There's a Part of the US-Australia Alliance We Rarely 
Talk about — Nuclear Weapons.” ABC News, February 27, 2019. www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-
27/us-australia-nuclear-alliance-in-the-indo-pacific/10849350. 
Ubinas, Helen. “I bought an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle in Philly in 7 minutes.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
June 13, 2016. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/columnists/helen_ubinas. 
Unsworth, Barrie. “Failure on guns an affront.” Sydney Morning Herald, May 10, 1996. 
Viser, Matt and Felicia Sonmez. “Joe Biden releases gun plan that would reinstate assault 
weapons ban and establish a voluntary buyback program.” The Washington Post, October 2, 2019. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/. 
Volokh, Eugene. “Is the United States of America a republic or democracy.” The Washington Post, May 
13, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/is-the-united-
states-of-america-a-republic-or-a-democracy/. 
Whitney, Craig R. Living with Guns: A Liberal’s Case for the Second Amendment. New York: Public 
Affairs, 2012. 
 
